

Facing a new World: Repositioning Police Services for the 21st Century

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It was the fifth of July 2016. Mr Oliver Schumann came home after a long day of meetings with mixed feelings. On the one hand he was happy as he had been charged with a major task which he interpreted as a strong signal of trust by his superiors. On the other hand, he was also worried because it was a daunting task. He works for a regional police force, and his boss asked him to lead a major repositioning initiative that involved a strategy redesign. The current strategy focused on “securing the region” was not adequately developed to address recent societal changes the police was facing at the time. Additionally, he knew from his own experience in the organization that most officers make fun about it and do neither find it appealing nor relevant. It was his first role as project leader and thus he felt a strong pressure to complete the project successfully. As a civilian employee he had been working for the regional police force for the past 3 years. Benefitting from a degree in strategy from a well-ranked institution he had been leading the police’s organizational development office since January 2013. This office develops, consults on and implements major organizational initiatives. Most of his colleagues look at it as being some form of in-house consultancy. Apparently, his superiors were satisfied with his performance on the job to date since he took over the position and hence, charged him with the task to lead the repositioning initiative.

On the one hand, he felt proud and enthused about the fact that he was given such an important project impacting the whole organization. “It may be a real chance and also a very interesting project”, he thought. Also additional resources were granted to him in order to expand his team and an increased budget for the next three years highlighting the importance of the project. Thinking thoroughly about it, he concluded that the project has the potential to be the springboard for his next promotion – but only if it was a success!

Thus, on the other hand he was very stressed, as he knew that a majority of change projects fail and that visions and strategies are easier written than implemented. For example, he vividly remembers the discussion that were triggered by a Towers Perrin Report¹ launched in 2013 on the high failure rates of change initiatives. The headline still stuck to his mind: “Only One-Quarter of Employers Are Sustaining Gains from Change Management Initiatives”. At all costs, he wanted to bring the majority of law enforcement officers behind him and to deliver a successful strategy redesign. He also remembers reading a recent study by McKinsey stating that 49% of company redesign projects fail (also see Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 6 for an overview of research identifying such failures). It seemed that he would have to cross a bridge over troubled waters, he thought. The fact that he was employed in a rather civilian function, not being a law enforcement officer working on the streets on a daily basis might be perceived as an additional obstacle by the law enforcement officers who form the largest fraction of personnel in the organization.

Also, time was pressing! He clearly was aware of the need to get feet on the ground and to start working on the project. But how should he start? His mind was spinning!

For valuable comments on earlier drafts I thank Prof. Rick Vogel, Prof. Matteo Caroli, Katharina Homberg and Ines Homberg. Note: The case is loosely based on real events, but has been anonymized and adapted to teaching purposes. All names and locations are fictional. All data is real. The case is intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation.

1. <https://www.towerswatson.com/en/Press/2013/08/Only-One-Quarter-of-Employers-Are-Sustaining-Gains-From-Change-Management>

The Regional Police Force (State Police; German: “Landespolizei”)

Mr Schumann’s employer was a large public organization: the Police. In many countries police services are organized by regions (hence technically speaking the region is the employer), e.g. in the UK there is Dorset Police, Hampshire Police or London Metropolitan Police and in Germany there are regional police forces such as Bavaria Police, Hesse Police or Saxony Police. In a similar way Mr Schumann’s employer covered a major region of his home country, Germany, a so called state (“*Land*”). The organization was a traditional public service provider operating according to principles of the Weberian bureaucracy, i.e. it was a legal-rule based organization. By nature police services are very hierarchical and could be labeled command-and-order organizations. In Germany several police organizations do exist. The Federal Police is attached to the ministry of the interior; the state polices are attached to the regional state governments. The regional state police forces are the main body law enforcement.

Although Germany ranks above the EU average in trust in the police measures (see exhibit 3), in the past couple of years the regional police have lost public trust and law enforcement officers perceived themselves as badly positioned to deal with new threats like religious extremism, terrorism, or cyber-attacks. An independent report on performance management in the German police stated: “Like other fields of the public sector, the police has been facing budgetary cutbacks, growing demands by the public, and decreasing attraction to young people. Due to demographic changes, the workforce of the German police is considerably aging, and young people are less and less willing to accept night and weekend work, overtime hours, moderate pay, and personal risks to safety and health.”²

Additionally, the 2015 regional criminal statistics also indicated a rise in the crime rate of roughly 3%. These data showed that the readiness for violence and crime increased in society generally. An independent research institute conducted a study among more than 681 law enforcement officers reporting the following findings:

“Regarding peri-traumatic factors, weapons were used against the officer in about every fifth assault (20.9%), whereas assaults from an (attempted) ambush occurred in 6.1% of all cases. Somewhat more than one third of all officers (37.3%) reported a work-loss of at least 7 days. Furthermore, the majority of the officers assumed that the offender injured them intentionally (87.8%). The question whether they behaved incorrectly was affirmed by about every fifth officer (22.2%). In 7 of 10 cases (70.5%), colleagues were also attacked during the assault. A total of 31.9% of all officers reported animosity toward the police as a motive for the attack. The officers used weapons in 31.2% of all cases.”³

2. D. Masal, D. & R. Vogel, 2016, p. 214.

3. K. Ellrich, & D. Baier, 2017, p.340/41.

These circumstances put additional pressure on the police with respect to public trust and employee morale. Hence the leadership had decided to initiate the development of an overall repositioning project that should culminate in the development of a new vision and strategy for the organization – the project Mr Schumann had been charged with. It was their hope that such a project would infuse new energy to everyone in the organization.

The organization had 23,000 employees of which 18.500 were public servants, the majority operating as law enforcement officers, or in simple terms policemen and -woman. Due to the particulars of the German system some civilian employees – like Mr Schumann himself - also worked for the police under a private sector employment contract ('public employees'; approx. 4.500 in this case). In contrast, individuals who were 'public servants' had a particular legal status and more comprehensive duties, which were due to their special relationship of loyalty to the state. While all law enforcement officers were public servants, administrative staff belonged either to the category of public servants ("*Verwaltungsbeamte*") or public employees ("*Verwaltungsangestellte*").

As of 2014, the majority of employees were above 30 years old with only 11% below that age. The mean age was 45.8 years and 71% were male employees. The rather high average age coupled with special retirement regulations for police officers led the organization to expect to see a high proportion of 7580 full-time-equivalents (FTEs) retiring within the next 10 years. By 2016, a first wave of retirements occurred but the remainder of the aggregate data did not change much.

The organization for a number of years was concerned about employee satisfaction and as a public sector organization faced frequent criticisms of being overly bureaucratic and inefficient. This led to increased pressures on budgets but also triggered a number of internal investigations. The HR department did run various employee surveys in order to get a better idea of what was happening. Sampling a fraction of employees from all divisions, i.e. the regional branches, the police academy, the presidency and the headquarter, a satisfaction survey was run recently yielding the results displayed in exhibit 2 (to which Mr Schumann has access).

The survey had been distributed to 3000 randomly sampled employees (public employees & public servants); overall 1165 individuals replied to the survey. Exhibit 2 provides a summary of values on key measures such as motivation, perceived red tape (i.e. a measure for bureaucracy), overall happiness and job satisfaction.

The budget amounts to EUR 1 billion annually. The organization also had a number of specialized units such as several SWOT team, mounted police, dog units and several units policing waterways and rivers. From 2013 to 2016 forces were particularly stretched when needed to staff operations in relation to mega-events such as sports events, or summits of political leaders and associated manifestations and protests. From time to time also the police is involved securing nuclear waste transports to the final repository.

The Organizational Units

Exhibit 1 displays a simplified organizational chart. The different organizational units are described below.

State Criminal Police Office (Headquarter)

The main task is to orchestrate the collaboration between the regional police force activities and national activities. Special task forces established ad-hoc are also located in the regional headquarter. The headquarter also runs a number of citizen surveys which shed light on not the readiness to register crimes. In many areas such as cybercrime only a minimum of victims formally register crimes. The summary of crime statistics also indicate an increase in violent acts against the police force across the region.

Regional Directorate

The regional directorate oversees service- and support activities for the region. It directs the information and communication technology, car and helicopter fleets and other support units. Other branches can request support for investigations and activities from the regional directorate.

The police academy

Responsible attracting, recruiting, training and education of police officers. It also organizes further professional development activities for the police staff. Each year approximately 100 (+/- 20%) are recruited into the profession.

Notes on Branches

Weissberg 1

This is the branch located in the largest city of the region with more than 500.000 residents. Thus, the branch has to deal with all facets of crime occurring in larger cities ranging from traffic control to protection of international summits and investigation of organized crime. This branch has seen a slight increase in crimes registered since 2013. The city is a meeting point for individuals sympathizing with the extreme left of the political spectrum. At least once a year a major demonstration and series of events lasting for several days creates unrest in the city among citizens. This is a challenging scenario for the police force.

Kreidewald 2

The region covered by this branch is home to a number of smaller towns and has approximately one million residents. In this region crime rates have been declining since 2011 and then remained rather stable since 2013 at about 80.000 registered crimes annually.

Lichthausen 3

This region is very similar to the one covered by branch town 2 but has a few more residents (1.5 million approximately). Several smaller towns which are home to a number of well known firms are located in this area. Crime rates in the region plummeted in 2013 but then jumped up again in 2014.

Lupusbruck 4

The region covers 1.2 million citizens who live primarily in rural areas and few small towns. The lowest crime rate since 2006 were registered in 2013 with 77.000 registered cases.

Malheide 5

The region is home to 1.7 million residents. Unfortunately, crime statistics are not available for this region. In terms of population it is very similar to Lupusbruck region.

Haxenburg 6

The region covers approx. 1 million inhabitants. While crime rates saw a 10-year low in 2013 the absolute level of registered crimes tends to be approx. 10% higher than in the other branches. Anonymized comparative crime statistics are available in exhibit 9 comparing this region to four other selected regions. Mr Schumann has access to these data.

Organization culture & values

Administrative traditions are defined as “a historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that define the nature of appropriate public administration within society”.⁴ Over time, a unique structure of public administration deeply rooted in societal value sets has emerged. Such value sets also shape the expectations towards public administration and define the work motives of those working in public sector organizations. In other words, configurations of such sets of values, structures and relationships give rise to unique administrative traditions that in turn form the levels of PSM-oriented work motives. Hence, administrative traditions help generating an understanding of heterogeneity between country clusters of different administrative traditions.

While different classifications of administrative traditions are possible, one can distinguish between the Anglo-Saxon, Napoleonic, Germanic, Scandinavian, Latin American, Postcolonial South Asian and African, East Asian, Post-Communist (former Soviet) and Islamic administrative traditions.⁵ In Germany public sector organizations follow Weberian principles, i.e. the Germanic tradition in Painter and Peter’s terms, that is they are primarily rule-driven. Their structures and

4. B.G. Peters, 2008, p.118.

5. M. Painter, & B.G. Peters. 2010.

processes have to comply with extensive legal requirements, suggesting that many rules and procedures of police organizations are largely predetermined by the law and are only to a limited extent subject to change efforts by organizational members.

The Germanic (or Weberian) tradition emphasizes a “*rule of law culture*”⁶ which binds public servants to be Weberian style legal rule followers.⁷ For example, in Germany, the activities of public servants are regulated by special laws and the career-based public service system relies on special loyalty requirements between the public servant and the state.

Similar to other public security organizations such as the armed forces, or fire departments authority in the police was exercised top-down following formal chains of decision making authority. Quite naturally such organizational arrangements leave little discretion at the bottom end of the hierarchy. Nonetheless, police officers are so-called street level bureaucrats interacting with the general public frequently which requires some degree of decision-making authority in order to build public trust.

The organization was male-dominated (as reflected by the 71% of male employees mentioned above). The organization also applied performance management systems using a range of quantitative measures in line with a national initiative on results-based police management.⁸ As a result a heavy reliance on scorecards was implemented generating a number of unintended consequences.⁹ However, the strong orientation on results-based police management in line with new public management principles which aim to bring private sector management practices into the public sector led to significant decreases in staff morale. Additionally, employees tend to shy away from voicing concerns and their personal views. The command-and-order nature of a police organization did not help to change this situation positively.

The organizations’ values focused on respect, justice and reliability. Again, this setup was very much in line with other public security organizations which needed to be perceived as high reliability organizations by the public in order generate desired levels of trust. The latest vision statement focused on *securing the region* (as part of the strategy currently in place) which was implemented through heavy reliance on multi-perspective reports aggregating scorecard information.

The organization – although being a national regional police force – in the past contributed to international missions. From 1994 to 2015 more than 500 law enforcement officers were seconded to contribute to United Nations missions, e.g. in Kosovo and other crisis regions.

6. S. Kuhlmann, & H. Wollmann. 2014, p.17.

7. R.E. Meyer, & G. Hammerschmid. 2010.

8. D. Masal, & R. Vogel, 2016

9. B.S. Frey, F. Homberg, & M. Osterloh, 2013.

Unionization

Traditionally Germany has a well-developed system of worker representation which is even codified in the law. As in many other countries union membership tends to be higher in the public sector compared to the private sector. Generally, union membership in all segments has declined since reunification. Nonetheless, in the special case of the police, the German Police Union is an association of 185.000 members of the police force across Germany.

The changing environment

Police organizations in all countries face a changing environment. As traditional public sector organizations the police tend to respond rather slowly to such changes. But threats like extremism and terrorism, cybercrime, increased public scrutiny and the speed with which news circulate and generate positive or negative public opinions towards the police had to be addressed. Both right-wing and left-wing militant actions gained in importance as either group became more organized when carrying out activities. Modern communication tools facilitated such development. A large-scale study of European police forces identified a number of common trends across countries. One is declining police authority: “The police are influenced by these changes in society in the sense that they perceive less respect for authority. Also, and related to this, people are behaving more violently toward the police. Indeed, quite a few interviewees believe that people justify violence much easier than before.”¹⁰

Other independent commentators looked at the police profession holistically. A published report by international consultancy McKinsey & Company declared:

“A modern police officer is expected to have the skills to deal with a wide range of scenarios: from identifying individuals at risk of radicalisation, or “grooming” for sexual exploitation or trafficking, to collecting and triaging digital evidence and investigating online crime, to dealing with highly vulnerable people and a wide range of communities and gathering evidence from them. This broad range of requirements challenges the traditional model of generalist police officers with a career for life.”¹¹

Another issue was changing demographics and public sector organizations like private sector firms needed to adapt to it. In Germany, the police had the advantage to be a preferred employer among young people completing secondary schooling. However, as they faced also high turnover rates due to the demographic change, this situation required a thoughtful focus on attraction and retention policies inside the organization.

10. A. van den Born et al. 2013, p.821.

11. McKinsey & Co., 2017, p.22.

...back to Mr Schumann

Thinking through the various aspects of the task over dinner Mr Schumann realized it was a key priority for him to get the ball rolling rather sooner than later. Complicating the matter, the first milestone was the project launch conference provisionally scheduled tenth of August 2016 which left only one month to develop a clear plan of how to run the project. What could the first steps be and what could the complete project plan look like?

Before taking any action, he decided to seek advice. A good friend of him, Tim Berg, who he knew since school works as a consultant for an international consultancy based in London. They have not spoken for a while, so Mr Schumann decides to call his friend this evening.

- Mr. Schumann: "Hi Tim, this is Olli speaking. Long time, no see. How are you?"
- Tim: "Great to hear from you, Olli. All good here; the usual stress at work with lots of traveling. How is the family?"
- Mr. Schumann: "All good, we have just moved into our new home. But look, I wanted to ask you a few work-related questions, is it convenient for you to talk now, or would it be better to talk on another day?"
- Tim: "Oh, interesting. No worries, I was about to shut down the computer and go home anyway. No more meetings for today but my train leaves in 40 minutes. So, just shoot...and we will have a quick chat about it!"
- Mr. Schumann: "Brilliant. Look...I have to run this repositioning project for the police. It is a bit daunting as I have to balance the interests of the higher ups and the many hard working officers. I really want to bring everyone on board!"
- Tim: "This sounds to me like a massive change initiative."
- Mr. Schumann: "Exactly...and I guess you know about the failure rates from your own work."
- Tim: "Don't tell me! It is so difficult to make change happen. But can you give a few more details on your current situation. I remember you took on this new role not too long ago?"
- Mr. Schumann: "It is three years now. And we have been successful in delivering several smaller projects. But this is the first one that affects the complete organization. Remember, these are about 22 thousand officers and civilian employees."
- Tim: "Ah, ok...I see. It might be a good idea start from the organization's history. Do you have any information on whether similar projects have been run in the past? If so, try to find out what worked and what did not in those projects."
- Mr. Schumann: "I am not 100% sure but given that we are a very traditional public sector organization it would be unlikely not to find any record of similarly large projects. That seems to be a good idea."

- Tim: “It is common practice in our firm to gather lots of information before developing suggestions for our clients. We even spend a number of weeks talking to the employees in order to see what attitudes and perceptions are currently. If you want people to support new ideas you need to know what they want, otherwise they will not buy-in to any of your suggestions.”
- Mr. Schumann: “Good thought. I need to think about how we can achieve it. It is not impossible to do, but we are not the most agile organization, so I will have to jump through a few loops. Another question: Would you recommend involving external people advising on all aspects of the process?”
- Tim: “That is a tricky question. I have now been doing this consultancy job for six years. I believe we do add value to most projects – but keep in mind most of our clients are private sector companies and can afford to buy our services. However, occasionally we also get complaints.”
- Mr Schumann: “What are these complaints about?”
- Tim: “Sometimes the executives hire us for developing ideas, but then exclude us from the implementation process. Very often this raises concerns about ‘letting them down’ on behalf of staff. Many also may think what we advise is unrealistic to be implemented. You know, there are lots prejudices towards consultants. Nonetheless, the projects that we accompanied from idea through implementation tend to be successes in the long run. Hence, it is worthwhile thinking about involving external people. Who do you have in mind?”
- Mr Schumann: “I am not sure yet. I need to think about it and see what the budget allows. But thanks a lot for your views. Definitely lots of food for thought for me!”
- Tim: “I am happy, that I was able to help you a bit. By the way, I think I have a project assignment in Germany in six weeks’ time – maybe we can meet during the weekend then?”
- Mr. Schumann: “Sure. Just send me your travel dates and we will work something out. Enjoy the train ride home. Talk to you later.”
- Tim: “Thanks. Bye.”

The conversation with his old friend Tim made Mr Schumann more relaxed that evening. He took the decision to devote the next couple of days at work to gather some more information. This meant spending a few hours each day in the archives and also probably reviewing a bit of literature on the matter.

The next days turned out to be very productive and helped Mr Schumann to develop a clearer picture of the essential aspects of the repositioning project. He found an insightful report on attitudes and perceptions of police staff that was conducted five years ago. But then it must have disappeared in the archives as he cannot remember having heard anyone talking about it, or even

thinking about implementing some changes based on the results. The basis of the report were interviews with police staff. Studying the report Mr Schumann noted a number of comments that appeared to refer to aspect that are also relevant for his project.

For example, regarding the overall positioning one member of the police said the following: *“In many of our work areas – and this is a genuine difference compared to most other occupations – the requirements are never same. In policing there is no ‘day-to-day’ routine activity, every sets new, unexpected and challenging demands. Hence it is thus of utmost important adjust the organization’s positioning continuously.”* Mr Schumann interpreted this to be an indication that whatever he is going to invent, is unlikely to be very long lasting. As a consequence he needed to embed a mechanism of adaptation into the new strategy.

Another comment reflected the past state of the organization. From his own experience and exchanges with colleagues over lunch and coffee, Mr Schumann knew that this comment reflected accurately the reality that most people in the organization perceive. In its blunt honesty the comment stuck with him: *“After having worked for more than nine years in a support function, I have lost all confidence and trust in the prevailing management processes. In the past, we had to pursue goals that were not agreed but imposed top-down...often resulting in high levels of frustration among both citizens and police personnel. Hopefully in the future the organization will be able to involve staff to a stronger extent.”* Other comments expressed views along similar lines highlighting the importance of the matter from the perspectives of lower ranked personnel: *“Learning and the successful change implementation must not be an isolated task of a small group. Instead it must involve the complete organization.”* For Mr Schumann it was clear that at all costs he needed to avoid his project being perceived as a top-down commanded management initiative. But how would he be able to achieve this? Still he was unclear about how to proceed from here.

The report also contained varied views on internal capabilities, skills and abilities of staff. One commentator said: *“There are work areas in which we lack expertise (e.g. cybercrime). It must be crucial to recruit expert staff in order to be future-ready. Rolling fixed-term contracts to deal with dynamic nature of appearance of new forms of crime may be a solution to keep organizational and staff capabilities up to date.”* However, others pointed to staff shortages by stating: *“Professional personnel planning is essential. In some branches staff is already unable to cope with our regular duties to a sufficient level of quality and citizen satisfaction.”* With a looming wave of retirements the situation becomes even more problematic. Internally also a set of statistics displaying developments public sector employment had been circulated (see exhibit 5). But again staff seemed to attribute the root of the problem to management failures as reflected in the following comments: *“Management by now has failed to declare its intention to react strategically to the continuously increasing workload and the increasing complexity of the work itself”* and *“Most goals are formulated from a top-down perspective. This ignores the contribution that everyone makes to the organization. Additionally, there is absolute no appreciation of diversity which appears to be important also in view of the demographic change occurring in society.”* All of this culminated in views about supervisor which are summarized in the following comment: *“Many supervisors do not listen,*

and ignore suggestions from their subordinates.” Mr Schumann realized that this general state of disillusionment among staff in these matters seemed to persist to date. It was clear to him that his project could only succeed if he was able to generate feelings of trust among the police staff. There seemed to be too much grown distrust into management and its initiatives which needed to be overcome.

This also meant creating a culture of error tolerance in which errors are tolerated and critical feedback acts as a support mechanism to avoid future errors (instead of punishment). Indeed, a comment from a very senior staff member reflected this aspect: *“I would wish for increased levels of error tolerance in the organization. But I have not experienced any step in this direction during my tenure – I have been here for 37 years”*. Mr Schumann thought further about this matter. Indeed, it may be problematic to instill a strong culture of error tolerance because of the political pressures in which the police is operating. At the end of the day, someone needs to take his hat if important missions fail.

He also came across an article in the journal *Police Quarterly* whose authors framed the problem accurately by stating: *“A serious problem with top-down strategies is that those on the bottom of the personnel hierarchy—the ones on whom effective implementation depends—may not always agree with or endorse the mission espoused by the higher-ups. This pitfall is particularly poignant in the policing context because officers and agencies are notorious for being resistant to change and difficult to mobilize (Boba & Crank, 2008; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). When top-tier personnel attempt to reorient an agency’s mission and function, they often run headlong into mid- and lower-level employees’ unwillingness to adopt a new ideology, due in no small part to the fact that lower level personnel are generally not consulted and their ideas are not sought (Toch, 2008). Lack of alignment between upper management and line personnel can result in the latter subverting new policies and rendering the entire endeavor null (Braga & Bond, 2008; Moore & Braga, 2003).”*¹²

After the time spent in the archives, Mr Schumann reached a point where he needed to meet with his team for an initial project briefing. He decided to summon Mr. Paul Schmidt, a long-standing policeman with a tenure of 22 years in the organization; Ms. Sarah Lange a recent Police Academy graduate who was aiming for a career in the highest level of the civil service; his personal assistant Mrs. Kappels and Mr. Georg Karten, again a police officer with 12 years of tenure.

He asked Mrs. Kappels to take the minutes of the meeting. Mr Schumann welcomed everyone to the meeting and asked everyone to speak openly and share all ideas. He wanted the conversation to be open, almost in form of brainstorming meeting. Then he started to describe the repositioning task he had been given: *“The task we have been given is a major initiative affecting the complete organization. The minister and the president of the police force wants us to reposition the organization through triggering a process that leads to a new strategy and then expects us to support its implementation. So...what should we do?”*. Everyone sighed realizing the problems associated with the task. Mr. Paul Schmidt was the first to speak: *“May I ask for a clarification: Are there any*

13. J.M. Gau, & D. Gaines, 2012, p.46.

guidelines on what the new strategy should entail or are we completely free in deciding what to develop? From my point of view this matter has important implications on the process that we should apply.” Mr Schumann confirmed that there was no specific guidance. The higher ups just realized that the current strategy was not up to date and not widely shared by the staff. “Ah,ok. That gives us lots of room to maneuver.” Mr Schmidt said. “But how can we establish the contents of the new strategy?” he continued. Ms. Lange jumped in to ask: “Is this not quite unusual for our organization? Do you have any experience with similar initiatives? I have not been here long enough to know if any form of best practice is available that we could replicate.” Both Mr Schmidt and Mr Kappels confirmed there was no precedent – at least not to their experience. Indeed, everyone could remember initiatives triggered from the top. But those usually came with clear guidance and little room to maneuver. Mr Kappels commented: “You all know what the atmosphere currently is. Many people are concerned and have made bad experiences with such top-down initiatives. I would suggest not looking at what we have done in the past but to invent something new.” Ms Lange now joined the conversation suggesting launching a survey to all staff to get some intelligence on the baseline attitudes from which to start. But Mr Karten countered: “We do this in regular intervals. Colleagues do not take such surveys seriously. Many consider it as distraction from work. Also, no one ever told us what happens to the result. If we pursue this course of action we will alienate people even more.” Mr Schmidt with cynical tone then turned to Mr Schumann: “So what did you learn at university about such situations?”

Mr Schumann replied: “Thanks for the pointer I will check my archives. I am pretty sure there is something useful in my old notes but I have not looked at it yet.” However, he felt embarrassed because over all the pressure he put on himself he forgot to think about the many classes on change management he had to take during his time at university. At home he kept a folder with lots of material related to this matter. He continued: “It seems to me that we have two problems to solve. On the one hand, the content of the new strategy needs to be identified. On the other hand, we need to make sure its process of development and subsequent implementation will not put-off our colleagues. At the end of the day, it will be crucially important to have everyone on board, supporting the new direction!” He went on: “So, let’s use the next couple days to develop some more refined ideas on these matters keeping in mind we need to get the ball rolling soon to be ready for the launch conference in early August. My suggestion is you split into groups and work independently. We will discuss your insights in our next meeting. So, Mr Schmidt, could you please pair up with Ms Lange? Mr Karten and myself will form the second group.” Everyone agreed to the plan and Mrs Kappels was asked to find a suitable meeting date for the next week. On his way home that evening Mr Schumann reflected on the day. Overall, Mr Schumann found the report and discussion with his team very helpful. The insights gained by reading the report helped him to identify important problem areas that are likely to shape the success or failure of his project. Listening and reacting on suggestions made by the workforce as well as the creation of a trust culture emerged as key issues. Additionally, both identification with the project and the organization seemed to be important factors. Actually, as a result of his conversation Mr Schmidt he also remembered his professors at university talking about ‘change agents’, that is regular

staff members who become convinced about a new initiative and act as multipliers and role models for others. Nonetheless, he was still unclear about the process he should apply. At home he checked his box containing the material from his studies and stumbled about Kotter’s classic work on leading change. Reviewing the model presented in here (see exhibit 7), he wondered to what extent it could be applied to a public sector organization like the police? He also found a summary sheet describing core elements of a strategy (see exhibit 8). This was particularly useful as a checklist, and will make sure he is not overlooking important elements. However, before he could worry about the exact contents of the strategy, he needed to find a way of developing the content in a way that would make it easy for everyone to support it. What would be the best way to tackle this problem?

Exhibit 1. Simplified Organizational Chart




Exhibit 2. Survey Results

Panel A.

BRANCH	JOB SATISFACTION	HAPPINESS	RED TAPE	MOTIVATION	OBSERVATIONS
REGIONAL DIRECTORATE	6.72	7.71	8.51	3.62	65
POLICE ACADEMY	6.85	7.74	8.85	3.74	27
CRIMINAL STATE POLICE OFFICE (HQ)	6.89	7.75	8.29	3.64	76
WEISSBERG	6.96	7.34	8.53	3.68	150
KREIDEWALD	6.73	7.29	8.70	3.64	175
LICHTHAUSEN	6.71	7.35	8.71	3.61	195
LUPUSBRUCK	6.98	7.51	8.49	3.74	150
MALHEIDE	6.90	7.65	8.62	3.65	181
HAXENBURG	6.67	7.32	8.51	3.67	146

NOTES: JOB SATISFACTION, HAPPINESS, RED TAPE SCALES RUN 0-10; MOTIVATION SCALE RUNS 1-5.


Panel B.

VARIABLE	OBSERVATIONS	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
JOB SATISFACTION	1,165	6.81	1.93	1	10
HAPPINESS	1,165	7.45	1.71	1	10
RED TAPE	1,165	8.58	1.61	2	11
MOTIVATION	1,165	3.66	0.60	1	5

Exhibit 3. Eurostat data on trust in institutions and the police

Figure 3.14. Trust in institutions, European countries


Mean average response, 0-10 scale, 2013



Note: Response options range from 0 (“No trust at all”) to 10 (“Complete trust”). The OECD EU average is the population-weighted average of the values included in the chart.

Source: Eurostat (2015), European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_pw03&lang=en

Exhibit 4



Source: <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/the-secrets-of-successful-organizational-redesigns-mckinsey-global-survey-results>

FACING A NEW WORLD

TASK	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
TOTAL	2,015,095	2,006,854	2,031,641	2,046,336	2,062,244	2,069,430	2,066,705
GENERAL SERVICES	674,514	670,762	675,348	676,527	675,537	677,410	676,990
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP & CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION	100,834	118,449	120,797	119,048	118,350	120,160	120,525
THEREOF: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	48,959	45,589	46,090	46,161	46,203	46,515	46,710
PUBLIC SECURITY	272,100	266,637	267,916	269,838	270,330	271,625	271,970
THEREOF: POLICE SERVICES	258,700	252,369	253,448	255,101	255,921	256,570	256,665
LEGAL PROTECTION	167,945	160,299	160,478	160,234	158,972	159,195	158,870
FINANCE ADMINISTRATION	130,953	125,378	126,157	127,407	127,885	126,425	125,630
EDUCATION, SCIENCE & CULTURE	1,090,747	1,145,487	1,163,293	1,180,381	1,192,857	1,201,445	1,199,770
SCHOOLS	698,372	713,468	722,595	729,174	728,733	723,125	720,090
UNIVERSITIES / HIGHER EDUCATION	350,504	381,065	391,553	402,223	414,269	424,110	426,410
THEREOF: UNIVERSITIES	150,787	150,394	155,286	158,677	162,000	167,315	167,840
SOCIAL SECURITY	37,534	31,144	32,601	26,031	27,030	27,110	27,420
HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT, SPORTS, RECREATION	43,594	40,367	41,884	45,497	45,909	42,355	42,735
THEREOF: HOSPITALS	21,702	19,580	19,581	21,415	21,692	20,500	20,700
HOUSING & COMMUNITY SERVICES	21,702	24,546	24,032	15,149	14,525	16,755	16,420
OTHER	147,004	94,548	94,484	102,750	106,386	104,355	103,375

SOURCE: [HTTPS://WWW.BOECKLER.DE/PDF/P_IMK_STUDY_51_2016.PDF](https://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_imk_study_51_2016.pdf); VESPER, D. (2016). AKTUELLE ENTWICKLUNGSTENDENZEN UND ZUKÜNFTIGER PERSONALBEDARF IM ÖFFENTLICHEN DIENST; TABLE 4, FTE STATES BY TASK

Exhibit 6. Failure rates of transformation projects

STUDY	METHOD	VARIABLE	RATE OF FAILURE	OBSERVATION
KIECHEL (1982, 1984)	INTERVIEWS CARRIED OUT IN THE PERIOD OF 1979-1984 WITH THEORETICIANS, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND CONSULTANTS FROM MOST OF THE MAJOR CONSULTING FIRMS. COMPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES AND OF THE HISTORY OF THE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FIELD. NO RESEARCH INSTRUMENT EXPLAINED AND NO OTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY.	PERCEPTION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES THAT CAN IMPLEMENT A STRATEGY SUCCESSFULLY	90%	KIECHEL (1982, 1984) IS CITED BY RESEARCHERS SUCH AS MINTZBERG (1994) AND KAPLAN & NORTON (2001). WE HAVE SEARCHED THE WEBSITES OF SOME OF THE COMPANIES INTERVIEWED BY KIECHEL (A.D.L., B.C.G., MCKINSEY, BAIN AND OTHERS), LOOKING FOR ANY STUDIES THAT THE CONSULTANTS INTERVIEWED MIGHT HAVE BEEN QUOTING, AND HAVE ALSO SENT E-MAILS TO THESE COMPANIES ASKING FOR A COPYB
CHARAN & COLVIN (1999)	'SEVERAL DOZEN CEO FAILURES' OBSERVED OVER DECADES BY THE AUTHORS AS MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE) AND TELEPHONE CALL INTERVIEWS WITH CEOS CHOSEN BY FORTUNE. SELECTION METHOD NOT SPECIFIED. SIZE OF TELEPHONE CALLS SAMPLE: 38. SOME CEOS DID NOT AGREE WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE AUTHORS. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ONLY	NUMBER OF STRATEGIES THAT, IN THE AUTHORS' VIEW, FAILED BECAUSE OF BAD IMPLEMENTATION	70%	CHARAN & COLVIN (1999) ESTIMATED THAT 70% OF THE STRATEGIES THAT FAIL, DO SO, BECAUSE OF BAD IMPLEMENTATION. CONTRARY TO KAPLAN & NORTON'S (2001: 1) GENERALISATION, THEY DID NOT ESTIMATE THAT 70% OF BUSINESS STRATEGIES FAIL!
JØRGENSEN ET AL. (2008)A (IBM GLOBAL BUSINESS SERVICES)	SURVEY OF 1,532 PRACTITIONERS – PROJECT LEADERS, SPONSORS, PROJECT MANAGERS AND CHANGE MANAGERS – FROM COMPANIES OF 15 DIFFERENT NATIONS IN THE WORLD AND IN 21 DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES. SAMPLE INCLUDED PRACTITIONERS FROM COMPANIES WITH MORE THAN 100,000 EMPLOYEES (14%), BETWEEN 100,000 AND 1,000 EMPLOYEES (64%), AND <1,000 EMPLOYEES (22%). PRACTITIONERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR A WIDE RANGE OF PROJECTS WITH A DIVERSE RANGE OF OBJECTIVES. ADDITIONAL DATA COLLECTED FROM IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS. THE UNIVERSITY OF BONN IN GERMANY PROVIDED STATISTICAL SUPPORT. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY AVAILABLE. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ONLY	NUMBER OF PROJECTS THAT DID NOT MISS ANY OF THE OBJECTIVES (TIME, BUDGET AND QUALITY GOALS)	59%	ACCORDING TO THE STUDY, 59% OF THE PROJECTS 'FAILED TO FULLY MEET THEIR OBJECTIVES: 44% MISSED AT LEAST ONE (TIME, BUDGET OR QUALITY GOALS), WHILE A FULL 15% EITHER MISSED ALL GOALS OR WERE STOPPED BY MANAGEMENT'
MCKINSEY (2008)A	SURVEY OF 3199 EXECUTIVES FROM INDUSTRIES AND REGIONS AROUND THE WORLD. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY AVAILABLE. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ONLY	PERCEIVED SUCCESS OF ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS	67%	

FACING A NEW WORLD

STUDY	METHOD	VARIABLE	RATE OF FAILURE	OBSERVATION
FRANKEN ET AL. (2009)	QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO ORGANISATIONS PREVIOUSLY KNOWN TO THE RESEARCHERS AND COMPOSED OF 50 QUESTIONS REGARDING THE BUSINESS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONTEXT, ORGANISATION CAPABILITY FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION AND BUSINESS PERFORMANCE. 93 COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRES WERE RETURNED FROM PREDOMINANTLY LARGE ORGANISATIONS IN A VARIETY OF INDUSTRY SECTORS. A PILOT WAS CONDUCTED WITH 10 ORGANISATIONS TO ENSURE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE QUESTIONS. SUBSEQUENT FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS WERE ALSO CONDUCTED TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATION AND SUPPORTING INSIGHTS. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ONLY	PERCEIVED STRATEGY EXECUTION PERFORMANCE	34%	THIRTY-FOUR PERCENT OF THE ORGANISATIONS IN THE SAMPLE REPORTED STRATEGY EXECUTION PERFORMANCE BELOW AVERAGE
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2013)	SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT IN MARCH 2013. SAMPLE OF 587 SENIOR EXECUTIVES FROM 19 DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES AND FROM NORTH AMERICA (30%), ASIA PACIFIC (30%), WESTERN EUROPE (21%), MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE (19%). EXECUTIVES IN THE SAMPLE ARE FROM COMPANIES WITH MORE THAN US\$10 BILLION IN ANNUAL REVENUE (25%), BETWEEN US\$10 BILLION AND US\$1 BILLION (33%), OR <US\$1 BILLION (42%). ADDITIONAL DATA COLLECTED FROM 7 IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS WITH SENIOR EXECUTIVES AND ACADEMICS WHOSE NAMES ARE IDENTIFIED. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY AVAILABLE. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ONLY	PERCEIVED SUCCESS OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES IN THE LAST 3 YEARS	44%	THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT PROVIDES FORECASTING AND ANALYSIS SERVICES BASED ON ACCURATE AND IMPARTIAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO DELIVER INSIGHTS TO DECISION-MAKERS. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A CONSULTING COMPANY
PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2014)	SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE AND THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT IN 2013–2014. SAMPLE OF OVER 2,500 PROJECT MANAGEMENT LEADERS AND PRACTITIONERS FROM COMPANIES ACROSS NORTH AMERICA, ASIA PACIFIC, EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION. NO OTHER INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY AVAILABLE. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ONLY	PERCEPTION OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES MEETING THEIR ORIGINAL GOALS AND BUSINESS INTENT	44%	PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE IS A NOT-FORPROFIT PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROJECT, PROGRAMME AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT PROFESSION. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED AS A CONSULTING COMPANY

SOURCE: EXCERPT FROM TABLE 1 IN CÂNDIDO, C. J., & SANTOS, S. P. (2015). STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: WHAT IS THE FAILURE RATE?. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION, 21(2), 237-262. SOURCE: EXCERPT FROM TABLE 1 IN CÂNDIDO,

Exhibit 7. Kotter's Change Model, Source: Kotter (2007, p. 100)

Establishing a sense of urgency

- examining market and competitive realities
- identifying and discussing crises

Forming a powerful coalition

- assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort
- encouraging the group to work together as a team

Creating a vision

- Creating a vision to help direct change effort
- developing strategies for achieving that vision

Communicating the vision

- Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies
- teaching new behaviours by the example of the guiding coalition

Empowering others to act on the vision

- getting rid of obstacles to change
- changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision
- encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions

Planning for creating short-term wins

- planning for visible performance improvements
- creating those improvements
- recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements

Consolidating improvements and producing still more change

- Using increased credibility to change systems, structures and policies that do not fit the vision
- Hiring, promoting and developing employees who can implement the vision
- reinvigorating the process with new project, themes and change agents

Institutionalizing new approaches

- Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success
- developing the means to ensure leadership development and succession

Exhibit 8. Summary contents page for a strategic plan

Vision

- A concise statement of what the organisation would like to become in the future.

Mission statement

- A relatively short, clear statement of the primary purpose(s) of the organisation. It might include the reason for being, what the organisation does, how it does it, and how the organisation is different from its competitors. The mission should reflect the values or the basic beliefs to which the organisation and its stakeholders have agreed.

Aims

- A list of the organisation's key strategic goals over an agreed period of time – typically five years. They should be generic and cover the whole of the planning period and even beyond it.

Objectives

- Specific targets, to be achieved at various points within the planning period, with an indication of the target and the means by which it will be achieved; the objectives could be organised into a hierarchy of primary and secondary objectives.

Ways in which the vision will be achieved

- This could be the 'operating statements' or 'action plans' – sets of tactics/groups of actions that will enable the strategy to be implemented successfully. It might also include a Position Statement, describing the organisation's current state, its services or products and its relationship to its competitors. Such a statement might also refer to key stakeholders.

Complementary documents

- A number of other documents should be referred to in the published plan. These are likely to include key policies and supporting strategies (e.g. Human Resources, Estates), as well as documents that analyse the institution's current position, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and departmental-level plans covering the planning period.

Source: Baker, D. (2007). Strategic change management in public sector organisations. Elsevier. P.151/152

Exhibit 9. Comparative Crime Statistics

REGION A (MR SCHUMANN'S REGION)		
	# CRIMES	
YEAR	REGISTERED	SOLVED
2012	557.22	339.9
2013	545.7	334.3
2014	552.73	335
2015	568.47	347.7
2016	561.96	345.1

REGION B		
	# CRIMES	
YEAR	REGISTERED	SOLVED
2012	626.87	396.4
2013	635.13	406.9
2014	650.87	419.5
2015	805.92	584.1
2016	882.47	581.9

REGION C		
	# CRIMES	
YEAR	REGISTERED	SOLVED
2012	495.3	221.3
2013	503.16	219.7
2014	543.16	243.9
2015	569.55	250
2016	568.86	239.1

REGION D		
	# CRIMES	
YEAR	REGISTERED	SOLVED
2012	140.09	90.12
2013	142.31	91.86
2014	142.06	90.78
2015	140.24	90.17
2016	149.23	95.2

Source: Internet search on official crime statistics

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