Libera Università Internazionale
degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli
PREMIO TESI D'ECCELLENZA

From guest workers to lobbyists: Turkey's efforts to transform its diaspora into a powerful ethnic group in Germany

Laura Sparascio

2022-2023

LUISS

Libera Università Internazionale
degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli

Working Paper n. 8/2022-2023
Publication date: Dicember 2024
From guest workers to lobbyists: Turkey's efforts to transform its diaspora into a powerful ethnic group in Germany

ISBN 979-12-5596-202-1

Luiss Academy is an imprint of
Luiss University Press – Pola Srl
Viale Pola 12, 00198 Roma
Tel. 06 85225485
E-mail lup@luiss.it
www.luissuniversitypress.it

Promoting the establishment of an ethnic lobby: a theoretical framework for the study of sending countries' mobilisation practices toward their diaspora abroad

By Laura Sparascio

ABSTRACT

Emigration countries are increasingly relying on diaspora engagement policies to foster ties with their overseas population, aiming to gather a wide range of benefits, from economic remittances to political support for the homeland's interests in the host country. The goal of this article is to provide a theoretical contribution to the study of sending governments' strategies directed at mobilising the diaspora to act as a loyal and influential ethnic lobby in the host country, and their effects. By analysing the existing literature on state-diaspora relations, specifically focusing on diaspora engagement strategies, as well as the literature on ethnic lobbies, this contribution suggests that merging these two theoretical frameworks could offer valuable insights into evaluating the efficacy of these practices. Furthermore, to fully understand the effectiveness of such mobilisation strategies, the framework should be further integrated with an analysis of the relationship between the sending government and its diaspora through the lens of the Principal-Agent model. This approach would highlight the potential existence of diverging interests between the sending government and its diaspora that may undermine the establishment of a consistently loyal ethnic lobby.

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the 2017 German parliamentary elections, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly criticised Germany's mainstream parties – the CDU/CSU, SPD, and the Greens– as detrimental to Ankara's interests, encouraging Turkish-origin voters in Germany "to teach a lesson […] at the ballot box" and "support those political parties who are not enemies of Turkey"[1]. This statement alarmed German policymakers, prompting then-Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign

[1] "Erdogan tells Turks in Germany to punish Merkel", *Deutsche Welle*, 2017, URL: https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-tells-german-turks-not-to-vote-for-angela-merkel/a40149680 [Last accessed on 23 August 2023].

Minister Sigmar Gabriel to condemn Erdoğan's remarks as an unacceptable interference in Germany's domestic politics[2].

Berlin's concerns over potential interference were rooted not only in the presence of a sizeable Turkish diaspora in Germany, numbering nearly three million people, but also in the growing number of policies pursued by the Turkish government toward its overseas population. Among these practices are the extension of civil and political rights, including the possibility of external voting, the enhancement of consular services, the establishment of ad hoc institutions dealing with these communities, all of which are complemented by discourses aimed at reaffirming national identity and belonging among diasporic groups. With these activities, the Turkish government aims at strengthening ties with its overseas population and fostering loyalty among Turkish-origin groups, therefore mobilising the Turkish diaspora to lobby in the countries of residence in line with the homeland's interests.

Phenomena like the one mentioned above are not an isolated case, but rather a striking example of how a sending government might try to exert influence on the politics of another country through its overseas population living there. Indeed, over time, diasporas, due to their long-term presence in host countries and the transnational connections they are able to maintain, have emerged as important political actors both in their home and host countries. This factor has not gone unnoticed by origin countries' policymakers and has prompted a growing number of states to adopt policies and establish institutions dealing with their overseas population and descendants[3].

The literature dealing with sending governments' practices towards their overseas population, also defined diaspora engagement policies, highlights the several goals that push governments to adopt such practices, ranging from economic benefits in the forms of remittances and investments to political benefits in the forms of electoral support in homeland elections and the establishment of a loyal ethnic lobby abroad capable of fostering the homeland's interests in the host country[4].

Analysing sending governments' ability to effectively engage with their population abroad with the goal of establishing an ethnic lobby carries significant implications, as it offers insights into the capacity of sending states to exert influence beyond their own borders. However, to the author's knowledge, the outcomes of diaspora engagement policies aimed at establishing a loyal and powerful ethnic lobby remain comparatively understudied.

---

[2] Ibid.

[3] A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora Institutions and Diaspora Governance", *International Migration Review*, 2014, vol. 48, p. 180.

[4] L.A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006, pp. 11; F. Ragazzi, "A comparative analysis of diaspora policies", *Political Geography*, 2014, vol. 41, pp. 74–89.

Acknowledging the existence and growing expansion of this phenomenon and the relative lack of research on the outcomes of sending governments' efforts aimed at mobilising their diaspora to foster the homeland's interests in the host country, the main purpose of this paper is to offer a theoretical framework that could be applied to the analysis of these phenomena, in order to provide a deeper understanding of how a sending country might seek to establish a loyal and powerful ethnic lobby in the host country.

In doing so, this contribution begins by considering the relevance of the issue at the political and social level, underscoring the importance of analysing this phenomenon, before exploring the evolution of the concept of diaspora in academic debates. It then examines the existing literature on sending states-diaspora relations, particularly focusing on diaspora engagement policies, as well as the ethnic lobby literature. The aim of these sections is to highlight how the two bodies of literature adopt a diametrically opposed approach to the study of diasporas, followed by an exploration of how these two approaches could be combined to analyse not only of the different dimensions of diaspora engagement policies, but also the effects of such policies on the political mobilisation of the diaspora in support of the homeland's interests. Additionally, the paper introduces the Principal-Agent model, suggesting how this framework can be further integrated to analyse the relationship between a sending government (acting as the principal) and its overseas population (acting as the agent) in light of the homeland's mobilisation efforts. Lastly, it will present the Turkish diaspora in Germany as a case study illustrating how the proposed framework could be applied in practice.

1. RELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, diasporas, migrant and ethnic groups are increasingly gaining attention for their potential role as political actors, performed both in the homeland and in the host country politics. Accordingly, sending countries have increasingly engaged with their population abroad to gain various types of benefits. In addition to the case of Turkey, the activities of the Moroccan[5] or Chinese[6] governments aimed at engaging with their overseas people could be mentioned as examples.

The existing literature on diaspora engagement policies, which will be discussed further below, emphasises mobilisation efforts in line with the homeland's interests as one of several goals that may drive sending states to adopt such practices. In other words, sending governments might attempt to foster ties with the overseas population with the aim of using the diaspora as a tool of foreign

[5] A. Üstübici, "Dynamics in emigration and immigration policies of Morocco: a double engagement", *Migration and Development*, 2015, vol 4, pp. 238–255.
[6] C. Schäfer, "China's Diaspora Policy under Xi Jinping: content, limits and challenges", *SWP Research Paper*, 2022.

policy. This involves encouraging the establishment of a powerful and loyal ethnic lobby, that is capable and willing to act in favour of the homeland's interests in the host country.

In the case of Turkey, studies show that the Turkish government has not only sought to mobilise its diaspora in Germany during the 2017 elections but, as highlighted by Adamson, has also mobilised its population abroad to undertake political actions to counter the recognition of the Armenian genocide in foreign countries[7]. For instance, in 2015 the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (*Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı*, YTB), an institution established by the AKP government to deal with overseas citizens and kin communities, has sought to influence the lobbying efforts of Turkish-origin organisations and the Turkish diaspora on this issue, by disseminating a booklet providing Ankara's perspective on the matter[8]. Similarly, existing studies on China's relations with its overseas population highlight how the Beijing government is attempting to use its diaspora as a tool of influence in foreign countries and as an ethnic lobby[9].

Given the evidence of the growing expansion of this phenomenon, assessing the ability of sending governments to effectively engage with their population abroad by establishing strong connections with the goal of mobilising overseas communities carries significant implications at both political and social levels.

First of all, from the political point of view, sending government's transnational practices directed at mobilising the overseas population offer insights into the capacity of sending states to exert influence beyond their own borders. Indeed, the increase in the number and range of state-led transnational activities carried out by sending governments may challenge traditional notions of national boundaries and territorial sovereignty, as countries might be able to exercise power in other countries through their diaspora. Furthermore, the ability of sending states to establish a loyal ethnic lobby might constitute a crucial tool for the conduct of foreign policy. If these strategies prove to be successful, emigration countries might growingly rely on these practices to advance their own interests in other countries. Lastly, as it could be imagined, transnational engagement policies might have an impact on the bilateral relations between sending governments and host countries. This is true both in the case of successful mobilisation efforts, when the sending government is able to influence the politics of the host country through its diaspora, and in the case of failure. Indeed, these transnational policies may be

[7] F.B. Adamson, "Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s)", *International Migration Review*, 2019, vol. 53, p. 226.
[8] A. Arkilic, "Empowering a fragmented diaspora: Turkish immigrant organizations' perceptions of and responses to Turkey's diaspora engagement policy", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2022, vol. 27, p. 597.
[9] A. Wong, *The Diaspora and China's Foreign Influence Activities,* in L. Myers (eds.), *2021-2022 Wilson China Fellowship- Essays on China and U.S. Policy*, Wilson Center, 2022.

perceived as an interference in the domestic politics by host countries' authorities, which could in turn lead to growing tensions between the two governments.

As a result, it appears to be crucial to understand to what extent countries can exploit their diasporas as a tool for statecraft. From the perspective of the sending country, assessing the level of success of mobilisation policies directed at the diaspora sheds light on the usefulness of these practices, offering a cost-balance analysis. Specifically, given that attempts to influence the politics of another country lie in the grey area between internationally accepted activities and foreign interference practices, an evaluation of the success and potential backlash to diaspora engagement policies from host countries can provide insights into the feasibility of this approach as a tool of statecraft. On the other hand, taking the perspective of the host country, evaluating the success of diaspora's engagement policies on the establishment of a loyal ethnic lobby could provide insights into the level of threat coming from these practices for the host country's sovereignty and internal stability. This could prompt countries to adopt policies and practices toward the sending country and the diaspora to limit the efficacy of diaspora engagement policies.

At the societal level, globalisation and the emergence of new means of communication have shaped the way transnational connections are sustained, leading to an increase in interactions between a diaspora and both the country and society of origin. This, combined with the growing ties sustained by the sending government, may, in turn, have an impact on the relations between the ethnic group and the larger host society, as well as on its integration in the host country's society. Specifically in the case of Turkish-origin communities in Germany, the German government has expressed concerns that increasing ties between the Turkish diaspora and its homeland, sustained by Ankara, might nurture dual loyalties among diaspora members and a stronger sense of belonging to the homeland. For instance, the enduring support of German-Turks for Erdoğan and the AKP in Turkish elections has sparked intense debate in Germany about the integration challenges faced by Turkish people, the failures of Germany's integration efforts[10], as well as concerns about these groups' support for undemocratic regimes. This has led some German policymakers to attempt to halt the passing of the dual citizenship reform proposal in Germany, on the basis that allowing Turkish citizens to retain the homeland's citizenship could reinforce dual loyalties and allegiance to undemocratic regimes[11].

---

[10] "Turkish support in Germany for Erdogan fuels integration debate", *France 24*, 2023, URL: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230601-turkish-support-in-germany-for-erdogan
-fuels-integration-debate[Last accessed September 2023].

[11] C. Dalaman, "Reactions from German politicians to Erdogan's voters: Demands to halt dual citizenship" *[Alman siyasetçilerden Erdoğan seçmenlerine tepkiler: Çifte vatandaşlık durdurulsun talepleri]*, *VOA Türkçe*, 2023, URL: https://www. voaturkce.com/a/alman-siyasetcilerden-

2. DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF DIASPORA: EXISTING REALITIES OR POLITICAL PROJECTS?

Today, a group of people is generally considered to constitute a diaspora if it possesses three elements: dispersal across multiple regions, the preservation of an identity separated from the host society, and a connection to the homeland through transnational activities, where the homeland provides the basis for its identity[12]. However, providing a precise and universally accepted definition of diaspora has proven difficult, as the concept evolved overtime to accommodate different groups of dispersed people.

Until the 1960s, the term "diaspora" was closely linked to the Jewish traumatic episode of dispersion, which was used not only as an example but as a definition of the term itself[13]. In the following decade, the term began to be used to describe the experiences of other groups, namely the Armenian, Greek, and African diaspora[14]. However, the characteristic of the paradigmatic case, the Jewish diaspora, were still maintained as a reference. As noted by Cohen, during this period, the notion of diaspora continued to consist of two elements: a catastrophic and traumatic event that forced people to leave their country of origin and the presence of a shared memory centred around the motherland, whether real or imagined[15]. Given its association with a catastrophic and traumatic experience, the term "diaspora" continued to carry negative connotations, being linked to a sense of victimhood.

However, over the years, due to both the increase in migration flows and the expanded use of the term in both academia and socio-political contexts, the meaning of "diaspora" evolved and progressively expanded. For instance, state and non-state actors within migrant groups and beyond began employing the term. Such discursive processes have modified the 'Jewish-centred'[16] approach to diaspora, leading to the inclusion of migrant groups that did not fit the classical definition of forced and traumatic dispersal. Consequently, the notion of diaspora has lost its negative connotation and has become associated with an idea of empowerment and mobilisation based on a strong community identity, created by a sense of belonging to the homeland[17]. Since the 1980s, the term has therefore been adopted to describe various groups, such as labour migrants emotionally and socially linked to the homeland, like Turks, Algerians, Italians, Mexicans, as well

---

erdogan-secmenlerine-tepkiler-cifte-vatandaslik-durdurulsun-talepleri/7118721.html [Last accessed August 2023].

[12] R. Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2005, vol. 28, pp. 1–19.

[13] Ibid.; R. Cohen, *Global diasporas: an introduction*, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 1.

[14] K. Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies,* 1996, vo. 5, pp. 3–36.

[15] R. Cohen, *Global diasporas: an introduction*, p. 4.

[16] K.D. Butler, "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies,* 2001, vol. 10, pp. 189–219.

[17] Ibid.

as migrants involved in the domestic politics of their country of origin in support of factions or terrorist groups, such as Albanians, Kurds, Irish, Palestinians[18].

As a result of these processes, today, the term "diaspora" is used to define several forms of dispersion, including exile groups, ethnic minorities, overseas communities[19]. In other words, this definition encompasses any ethnic group living outside its home country that could be considered a 'transnational community'[20], as it develops cross-border ties with the home society.

Recognising that globalisation has led to increased migration flows and more opportunities for migrant communities to sustain transnational links with the home state, scholars from several disciplines attempted to provide a new definition of diaspora that moves "beyond the Jewish experience"[21], while keeping its explanatory power intact. These attempts could be divided into two approaches: an approach that views the diaspora as a social reality and an approach that views the diaspora as a political project.

Two prominent examples of the first approach are the studies of Safran[22] and Cohen[23]. The scholars developed a set of characteristics pertaining to diasporas, that would allow to distinguish them from other social formations. The starting point of this perspective, therefore, rests on the assumption of the existence of diasporas as real entities. For instance, Cohen's list, built on Safran's previous work, includes: (1) displacement, sometimes brought on by a traumatic event, from the native homeland to two or more locations, or (2) the expansion from the home country in pursuit of economic incentives or colonial goals; (3) the presence of a shared recollection of the homeland, that often bring (4) an idealisation of the motherland and a commitment to its maintenance and (5) a myth of return; (6) a strong identity built on a sense of uniqueness and a shared past, culture and religion and (7) the existence of boundaries with the host society, leading to a partial isolation within the country of settlement; (8) the existence of strong ties with other co-ethnics abroad; (9) the possibility for the ethnic group to keep its distinctiveness in host countries that tolerate pluralism[24]. Based on these characteristics, Cohen attempted to construct a classification of diasporas, that could include groups with different experiences and histories. The taxonomy comprises: victim diasporas, which include the most classical examples like Jewish, Africans, or Armenians; labour diasporas, formed by labour migrants

[18] R. Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora".
[19] K. Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", p. 3.
[20] S. Dufoix, *Diaspora before it became a concept*, in R. Cohen, C. Fischer (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies*, Routledge, 2018, p. 30.
[21] L. Varadarajan, *The domestic abroad: diasporas in international relations*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, p. 7.
[22] W. Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 83–99.
[23] R. Cohen, *Global diasporas: an introduction*.
[24] Ivi, pp. 16–18.

recruited abroad, such as Italians, Japanese, Turks; trade diasporas, like Lebanese or Chinese; imperial diasporas, like Russians or British; deterritorialised diasporas like Roma, Muslims, Parsis and other religious groups.

By contrast, the second approach rejects the idea of studying diasporas as a "bounded entity"[25], arguing that this method fails to identify how and by whom the diasporas' strong identity is shaped. Therefore, several scholars[26] have begun to describe the diaspora as a political project. In other words, diasporas, depicted as homogeneous communities with a strong in-group identity, do not exist on their own; rather, they are created and sustained by several actors, such as governments and non-state political entrepreneurs, through discourses and practices. According to this perspective, diaspora is a category of practice, a claim that produces identities, fosters mobilisation, and creates loyalties[27]. Political actors, when referring to a group of people living outside the homeland, adopt the term "diaspora" in their discourses as a "category for mobilisation"[28], prescribing certain actions and sustaining a strong in-group identity linked to national belonging, even among highly heterogeneous groups.

While acknowledging the possibility for different actors, like members of the community itself, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations, to engage in such diaspora-making projects, this contribution will primarily focus on the role of sending states. Through policies and discourses, states may attempt to categorise their population abroad as a homogeneous group with a strong identity and to "attach consequences to categories"[29]. Consequently, when a state refers to its overseas citizens or their descendants as a diaspora, it prescribes a sense of uniformity, a collective identity, and a sense of duty and loyalty toward the homeland, thereby a mobilisation on its behalf[30]. This is possible because, as mentioned earlier, the concept of diaspora has lost its connotation of victimhood and is now linked to a sense of empowerment around a

---

[25] R. Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora".

[26] F. Adamson, M. Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing", *European Journal of International Relations – EUR J INT RELAT*, 2007, vol. 13, pp. 489–526; R. Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora"; S. Dufoix, *Diaspora before it became a concept*; A.S. Okyay, *Diaspora-making as a state-led project : Turkey's expansive diaspora strategy and its implications for emigrant and kin populations* (PhD Thesis), European University Institute, 2015; L. Varadarajan, *The domestic abroad: diasporas in international relations*.

[27] R. Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora".

[28] N. Kleist, "In the Name of Diaspora: Between Struggles for Recognition and Political Aspirations", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2008, vol. 34, pp. 1127–1143.

[29] R. Brubaker, J. Kim, "Transborder Membership Politics in Germany and Korea", *European Journal of Sociology*, 2011, vol. 52, p. 24; A.S. Okyay, *Diaspora-making as a state-led project: Turkey's expansive diaspora strategy and its implications for emigrant and kin populations* (PhD Thesis), European University Institute, 2015, pp. 3–4.

[30] F. Ragazzi, *When Governments say Diaspora: Transnational Practices of Citizenship, Nationalism and Sovereignty in Croatia and Former Yugoslavia* (PhD Thesis), Northwestern University, 2010.

collective identity. Accordingly, scholars recognise that state elites may label their population abroad as diaspora as a means to organise the overseas population into a cohesive group that provides economic and political resources[31] to the homeland.

The latter approach, which views diasporas as political projects put forward by state and non-state actors to empower groups of people based on a strong sense of identity and belonging to the homeland, helps to explain how and why governments that did not use this term for a certain period, have begun to engage with and categorise their population abroad as a diaspora in their discourses and practices, shedding light on the underlying aims and the strategies used. Moreover, the next section will highlight how the adoption of the concept of diaspora by states toward their co-ethnics abroad is usually accompanied by other practices and policies aimed at engaging with the overseas population, also called diaspora engagement policies.

3. STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS: TRANSNATIONALISM STUDIES AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES

In the 1990s, with the so-called 'transnational turn'[32], migration studies started to adopt transnationalism as a theoretical framework for analysing the complex lives of migrants and the ongoing social, economic, and political connections that overseas people sustain with their home societies. In the article "Towards a definition of Transnationalism" Glick Schiller et al. defined transnationalism as the "emergence of a social process in which migrants establish social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders"[33].

This approach emerged as a response to methodological nationalism, a framework often adopted in social sciences[34], which was criticised for considering nation-states as the primary unit of analysis, while overlooking the importance of migrants as agents. Early literature on transmigration, therefore, avoided a state-centric perspective, viewing transborder activities predominantly as a people-led process put in place by transmigrants who maintain connections in both their home and receiving countries[35]. Given the permanent links between a diaspora

[31] F. Adamson, M. Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of `State' and `National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing".

[32] E. Tellander, C. Horst, "A Foreign Policy Actor of Importance? The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Shaping Norwegian Policy towards Somalia", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2019, vol. 15, p. 139.

[33] N.G. Schiller *et al.*, "Towards a Definition of Transnationalism", *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1992, p. ix.

[34] A. Wimmer, N. Glick Schiller, "Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the social sciences", *Global Networks*, 2002, vol. 2, p. 302.

[35] L. G. Basch *et al.*, *Nations unbound: transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states*, Gordon and Breach, 1994; A. Portes, *Globalization from below: the rise of transnational communities*, in W.C. Smith, R. Korzeniewicz (eds.), *Latin America in the world economy*, CN, Westport, 1996, pp. 151–168; A. Portes, "Conclusion: Towards a new world

and its homeland discussed in the previous section, a branch of literature within migration studies considers diasporas as an example of transnational communities[36], as independent actors capable of playing crucial social and political roles in both their home and host countries through transnational practices[37]. Within this realm, diasporas received growing academic attention for their transnational role in many fields: as economic agents through remittances and investments[38]; as peacemakers or peace-breakers in civil conflicts[39]; and in more general terms as political actors[40].

However, while earlier studies emphasised the role of transmigrants as independent actors, later studies reintroduced the role of states in promoting or limiting such transnational activities. Academic interest in the role of nation-states in this realm emerged from the empirical evidence that, from the 1990s, sending states increasingly engaged with their overseas citizens through various practices, policies, and discourses.

Discursive practices by state elites of labelling co-ethnics abroad as a diaspora, discussed in the previous section, are just one example of such engagement. Consequently, an expanding body of literature started to focus on sending states' policies toward their population abroad[41], often referred to as diaspora

– the origins and effects of transnational activities", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1999, vol. 22, pp. 463–477; N.G. Schiller *et al.*, "Towards a Definition of Transnationalism"; M.P. Smith, L. Guarnizo (eds.), *Transnationalism from below*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J, 1998.

[36] K. Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", p. 4.

[37] Y. Shain, A. Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, 2003, vol. 57, pp. 449–479.

[38] A. Portes, *Globalization from below: the rise of transnational communities*.

[39] Diaspora groups can send financial and material support to factions in the homeland. Examples are the Sri Lankan Tamil groups in support of Tamil Tigers, Kurdish groups, the Croatian diaspora's role in the creation of an independent state. See F. Adamson, *Mobilizing for the Transformation of Home: Politicized Identities and Transnational Practices*, in N. Al-Ali - K. Koser (eds.), *New Approaches to Migration?,* Routledge, London 2002, 1ª ed.; R. Cohen, *Global diasporas: an introduction*, pp. 169–170; T. Lyons, "Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia: Analysis", *Conflict, Security & Development*, 2007, vol. 7, pp. 529–549; C. Orjuela, "Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka's violent conflict", *Global Networks*, 2008, vol. 8, pp. 436–452.

[40] N. Al-Ali, K. Koser, *Transnationalism, international migration and home*, in Id. *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, Routledge, London 2002, 1ª ed., p. 581; E. Østergaard-Nielsen, "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices", *The International Migration Review*, 2003, vol. 37, pp. 760–786.

[41] See M. Collyer (eds.), *Emigration Nations, Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 2013; A. Délano, A. J. Gamlen, "Comparing and theorizing state-diaspora relations", *Political Geography*, 2014, vol. 41, pp. 43–53; A.J. Gamlen, "The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination", *Political Geography*, 2008, vol. 27, pp. 840–856; A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora engagement Policies: what are they and what kinds of states use them?", *University of Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), Working Paper,* no. 06/32, 2006; J. Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship:

engagement policies or diaspora strategies. These studies analyse and classify the different policies adopted by states of origin, seek to understand the motivations behind these policies, and categorise states according to the different institutions and practices adopted.

For instance, Levitt and De la Dehesa examine five different types of policies implemented by sending countries towards their citizens abroad: institutional reforms, with the creation or reform of ad-hoc institutions and the reform of consular services; strategies to attract money transfers from workers abroad; the expansion of political rights to the population abroad, such as dual nationality or the possibility of external voting; enlarging the range of assistance by sending government's agencies; symbolic policies to increase a sense of loyalty among the overseas population[42].

In his work, Francesco Ragazzi combines different types of policies – symbolic, religious and cultural, social and economic, and bureaucratic control practices – that states can implement, creating a typology of states according to their relations with their population abroad. This typology includes indifferent states, which do not adopt any type of policy; closed states, which adopt policies to restrict the movement of people and do not allow external voting, such as North Korea; managed labour states, which adopt investment schemes and focus on the economic potential of migrants; expatriate states, who focus on cultural and educational policies, such as France, Spain, Germany or Italy; global-nation states, which adopt a wide range of policies – from enhancing political, social and civil rights of their diaspora to symbolic policies aimed at reinforcing the national identity of migrants – to capture economic and political resources from their overseas population, including lobbying in their favour[43]. Clearly, sending-countries do not adopt a homogeneous set of policies, and differences can be found not only among states on a cross-country comparative analysis but also across time within the same country.

To explain the variations over time and space in the relationship between origin states and migrants, and the rationale behind the choice of certain states to engage with their diaspora at a specific moment and with specific policies, scholars of the discipline offer various explanations. These range from the symmetry/asymmetry in the relations between receiving and sending states to the economic and political situation of the sending country, encompassing the level of

---

The Institutions of Immigrants' Political Transnationalism", *International Migration Review*, 2000, vol. 34, p. 1126; P. Levitt, R. De La Dehesa, "Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: Variations and explanations", *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 2003, vol. 26, pp. 587–611; E. Østergaard-Nielsen (eds.), *International migration and sending countries: perceptions, policies, and transnational relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2003; F. Ragazzi, "A comparative analysis of diaspora policies".

[42] P. Levitt, R. De La Dehesa, "Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: Variations and explanations".

[43] F. Ragazzi, "A comparative analysis of diaspora policies".

integration of the diaspora in the host country. Reviewing the existing literature on state's interest in overseas communities, Brand provides a list of possible explanations, that can be summarised as follows[44]:

- Economic reasons: especially in the case of labour migration from developing countries, states might be interested in remittances by migrants and brain gain of skilled returnees[45];
- Security reasons: states may engage with their diasporas to control and suppress potential dissent from abroad, especially in the presence of political exiles[46];
- Domestic politics reasons: especially during transitions from authoritarianism to participatory political regimes, the governing elite may seek to engage with its population abroad to enhance its domestic legitimacy and garner electoral support[47];
- Foreign/International politics reasons: sending states might engage with their overseas population when they realise that co-ethnics abroad could act as a loyal lobby able to exert influence on host countries in line with the policy agenda of the sending state[48];
- Historical reasons: factors like the history of emigration, the shift from temporary to permanent migrants, changes in the level of migrants' socioeconomic assimilation into the host society, and the size of migrant communities can also be behind the choices of policies of sending states. From a large-scale perspective, changes in the power of the sending state in the International System and a more symmetric relationship with the country of residence could also explain the adoption of engagement policies by the sending state[49].

---

[44] L.A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, p. 13–19.

[45] Ivi.; A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora engagement Policies: what are they and what kinds of states use them?"; J. Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants' Political Transnationalism".

[46] L.A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*.

[47] Ibid; A.S. Okyay, *Diaspora-making as a state-led project: Turkey's expansive diaspora strategy and its implications for emigrant and kin populations* (PhD Thesis), European University Institute, 2015.

[48] R. Bauböck, "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism", *The International Migration Review*, 2003, vol. 37, pp. 700–723; S. Dufoix, *Diasporas*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008; J. Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants' Political Transnationalism", p. 1131; A.S. Okyay, *Diaspora-making as a state-led project : Turkey's expansive diaspora strategy and its implications for emigrant and kin populations* (PhD Thesis), European University Institute, 2015; E. Østergaard-Nielsen (eds.), *International migration and sending countries: perceptions, policies, and transnational relations*, p. 18.

[49] L. A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*.

Aware that different factors operate at different levels to shape sending states' policies towards their population abroad, Alan Gamlen provides a typology of diaspora engagement policies. His framework takes into consideration the fact that diaspora policies are not part of a single, well-coordinated strategy, but they are rather a collection of a wide range of activities and initiatives developed "at different times, for different reasons"[50]. His typology consists of three higher-level types of policies: capacity-building policies, extending rights to the diaspora, and extracting obligations.

Capacity-building policies include symbolic nation-building and institution-building measures. The first term refers to the discourses and practices adopted by sending states as an attempt to depict the transnational community as part of the national population, to cultivate a diasporic identity among the population abroad linked to the nation-state, and to forge loyalty toward the origin state. Examples include sociocultural measures, such as the organisation of events and celebrations, national language and history courses, the provision of religious services, or encouraging the creation of migrant associations[51]. This may also involve discursive practices of labelling the population abroad as a diaspora, as discussed in the previous section. The second term, institution-building policies, refers to the policies adopted at the bureaucratic level to create dedicated institutions or reform existing ones.

Extending rights to the diaspora involves the expansion of civil, political and social rights, including allowing dual nationality/citizenship, external voting rights, or signing social security agreements with the host country. These policies aim at bolstering the legitimacy of the sending state vis-à-vis the diaspora. However, as Gamlen notes, countries might hesitate to adopt these types of policies due to concerns about impact of exile votes and the financial costs of extending social rights[52].

Lastly, having re-included the diaspora into its national population by fostering a national identity and transnational ties among migrant communities, and having granted rights to the overseas communities, the sending state may seek economic and political benefits in return. Economic objectives might include investment schemes, attracting FDI and remittances, while political benefits include garnering votes from the diaspora and the promotion of a lobby abroad. To achieve the latter, crucial policies involve measures allowing dual citizenship and promoting naturalisations, as well as encouraging the population abroad to vote in the country of residence considering the interests of the homeland, or even advocating

[50] A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora engagement Policies: what are they and what kinds of states use them?", p. 4.
[51] A.J. Gamlen, "The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination".
[52] A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora engagement Policies: what are they and what kinds of states use them?", p. 10.

for the establishment of an actual lobbying organisation[53]. However, as highlighted by Østergaard-Nielsen, there are no formalised explicit policies in this regard, being it a sensitive realm that could potentially provoke a backlash from the host country[54]. Indeed, such actions might be perceived as illegitimate interferences in the host country's domestic politics.

Type of Diaspora Engagement Policy																							
Capacity Building									Extending Rights											Extracting Obligations				
Symbolic nation-building				Institution building					Political incorporation								Civil and social rights		Investment policies & lobby promotion				
Inclusive rhetoric & symbols	Cultural promotion & induction	Shaping media & PR	Conferences & conventions	Ministerial level agency	Dedicated bureaucracy	Monitoring efforts	Building transnational networks	Consular and consultative bodies	Special membership concessions	Dual nationality (no vote)	Must return to vote	Embassy voting	Postal voting	Indefinite, unconditional vote	Parliamntary representation	Can run for office	Tourism services	Welfare protection	Mandatory payments	Special economic zones	Remittance and FDI capture	Knowledge transfer programmes	Promoting expat lobby

Table: Types of Diaspora Engagement Policies
Source: A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora Engagement Policies: What Are They and What Kinds of States Use Them?" *University of Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), Working Paper*, no. 06/32 (2006), pp. 9.

As it emerges from Gamlen's categorisation and the existing literature on diaspora engagement policies, sending states may engage in transnational activities to extract political and economic resources from the population abroad, sometimes even exploiting the population as resources[55]. Among the often-mentioned political benefits that a sending government might obtain from its population abroad is the establishment of an ethnic lobby. However, to the author's knowledge, the literature on diaspora engagement policies does not provide a deep exploration of what constitutes an ethnic lobby and the extent to which a government is capable of promoting its establishment.

[53] E. Østergaard-Nielsen (eds.), *International migration and sending countries: perceptions, policies, and transnational relations*, pp. 18–20.
[54] Ivi, p. 213.
[55] L.A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, p. 11.

4. ETHNIC GROUPS' INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICS OF THE HOST COUNTRY: STUDIES ON ETHNIC LOBBIES

Ethnic lobbies are the object of focus of a strand of political science literature that examines the practices of ethnic groups to influence the foreign policy of the host country, mainly focusing on the United States political system, where several well-established ethnic communities have organised and formed professional lobbying organisations whose aim is to influence the US foreign policy in support of the homeland or co-ethnics abroad[56].

Within the literature, ethnic identity groups are often defined as "politically relevant social divisions, based on a shared sense of cultural distinctiveness"[57]. The collective identity of the group can be engendered by cultural, ethnic, racial, or religious ties. Diasporas, possessing an internal collective identity based on ties to the homeland, may therefore fall under this definition.

According to scholars, ethnic identity groups may try to influence the foreign policy of their host country toward their homeland by organising as interest groups within their country of residence[58]. Studies on how these groups might act as ethnic lobbies have focused on both more institutionalised and professional forms of ethnic interest groups[59], such as the Polish American Congress, the Cuban American National Foundation, or the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, as well as broader societal groups[60], defined as a "loose coalition of individuals and organisations"[61] engaged in shaping the foreign policy of the country of settlement. The latter does not concentrate on a single, cohesive organisation with a clear leadership and membership, but on a wide array of groups and individuals

---

[56] See M.E. Ahrari (eds.), *Ethnic groups and U.S. foreign policy*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987; T. Ambrosio (eds.), *Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy*, Praeger, Westport, Conn, 2002; D.H. Goldberg, *Foreign policy and ethnic interest groups: American and Canadian Jews lobby for Israel*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1990; P.J. Haney, "Ethnic Lobbying in Foreign Policy", *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2010; C. McC. Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, 1981, vol. 59; D.M. Paul, R.A. Paul, *Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2009.

[57] T. Ambrosio (eds.), *Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy*, p. 1.

[58] H.M. Rytz, *Ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy-making: a Cuban-American story of success and failure*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, New York, 2013.

[59] T. Ambrosio (eds.), *Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy*; P.J. Haney, W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1999, vol. 43, pp. 341–361; H. M. Rytz, *Ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy-making: a Cuban-American story of success and failure*.

[60] W.M. LeoGrande, "Pushing on an Open Door? Ethnic Foreign Policy Lobbies and the Cuban American Case", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2020, vol. 16, pp. 438–456; J.J. Mearsheimer, S.M. Walt, *The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2007; Y. Shain, "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy", *Political Science Quarterly,* 1994, vol. 109, pp. 811–841.

[61] J.J. Mearsheimer - S. M. Walt, *The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy*, p. 5.

within the same ethnic community, displaying some forms of organisational expression.

Concerning the strategies employed by ethnic interest groups to influence both the host government's decisions and public opinion, Oświecimski argues that such practices fall into three categories: direct lobbying, indirect lobbying, and lobbying based on elections[62]. First, direct lobbying involves efforts of ethnic lobbies to bring an issue to the government's policy agenda, by providing information and policy analysis to decision-makers. Moreover, ethnic lobbies may monitor the adoption of policies and react to foreign policy decisions by providing supplementary information and engaging in letter-writing campaigns[63]. Secondly, acting as a voting bloc, participating in election campaigns, and providing financial campaign contributions to candidates[64] are part of lobbying activities based on elections. Lastly, indirect lobbying strategies involve the mobilisation of the broader ethnic community to write letters, sign petitions, and organise demonstrations[65]. To put it differently, it encompasses various forms of grassroots activities.

Scholars in ethnic lobby studies have faced challenges in assessing the success of these groups in influencing the foreign policy of the host country. Aware of the difficulties in measurement, influence is generally operationalised as the impact of ethnic interest groups' activities on foreign policy decisions[66]. Therefore, efforts of ethnic lobbies are deemed successful if two conditions are fulfilled: the outcome of a foreign policy decision aligns with the interests of the ethnic group itself and the ethnic interest group actively participated in reaching that outcome.

In addition, while attempting to explain why certain ethnic groups, such as Jewish-Americans, are more successful in influencing US foreign policy compared to others, like Arab groups, political scientists have sought to identify a list of criteria or conditions affecting the lobbying success of ethnic minority groups[67]. Rubenzer categorises these factors into two groups: characteristics that are internal to the ethnic group and contextual factors, that relate to the socio-political

---

[62] K. Oświecimski, "What makes ethnic groups in the United States politically effective", *Horizons of Politics,* 2013, vol. 4, pp. 43–74.
[63] T. Ambrosio (eds.), *Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy*.
[64] T. Smith, *Foreign attachments: the power of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, England, 2000.
[65] D.M. Paul, R.A. Paul, *Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy*, p. 23.
[66] W.M. LeoGrande, "Pushing on an Open Door? Ethnic Foreign Policy Lobbies and the Cuban American Case".
[67] P.J. Haney, W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation"; T. Rubenzer, "Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2008, vol. 4, pp. 169–185; H.M. Rytz, *Ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy-making: a Cuban-American story of success and failure*.

environment in which the ethnic group operates[68], and are often referred to as political opportunity structures[69]. According to Rubenzer, each individual factor is not necessary to determine the success of ethnic groups in influencing the foreign policy of the host state, as different conditions can combine in different ways to create "multiple paths to influence"[70].

With regard to the characteristics of the ethnic minority group, internal factors include material power and identity power[71]. Identity power revolves around a strong collective ethnic identity, reinforced through rituals and transnational ties with the homeland, providing strong incentives for mobilisation[72]. Moreover, the ethnic group's success will depend on its material capabilities, such as financial resources and its organisational strength, which includes the existence of a professional lobbying branch. The presence of a professional organisational structure is deemed to be particularly important to mobilise voters[73] and members of the community on specific issues. In addition, other internal factors involve the size of the community and its geographical concentration, which bolster the political clout of ethnic groups[74], increases the potential for grassroots mobilisation, and reinforces a sense of cohesion and identity[75]. Other frequently cited factors in this domain are the partial assimilation of the ethnic group within the society[76], which enables the group's acceptance within the host society while maintaining distinctive ethnic identity, as well as the size and level of the political activity and unity of the ethnic community[77]. Hence, a successful ethnic group should not show strong in-group political divisions and should engage politically, not only through formal political participation in elections – as voters and candidates – but also by organising rallies, protests, and petitions.

---

[68] T. Rubenzer, "Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis".
[69] H.M. Rytz, *Ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy-making: a Cuban-American story of success and failure*, p. 7.
[70] T. Rubenzer, "Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis", p. 183.
[71] H.M. Rytz, *Ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy-making: a Cuban-American story of success and failure*, pp. 2–3.
[72] J. Rynhold, "Divide and Rule: Discursive Authority, Identity Dissonance, Ethnic Lobbies, and US Foreign Policy, or How President Obama Defeated AIPAC over the 2015 Iran Deal", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2021, vol. 17.
[73] Ibid.
[74] T. Ambrosio (eds.), *Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy*; P. J. Haney - W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation".
[75] D.M. Paul,R.A. Paul, *Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy*.
[76] P.J. Haney, W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation".
[77] T. Rubenzer, "Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis".

Moving on, an often-cited external factor influencing the success of ethnic lobbying, that is related to the political context, is the permeability of and access to political power[78], which is determined by the institutional setting of the political system. Concerning the American political system, it has been argued that ethnic groups have higher chances of success when the Congress is involved in the decision-making, as it is deemed to be more permeable to societal influence[79]. Additionally, scholars focused on the strength of opposition, that is the presence and activity of rival ethnic groups, the alignment between the foreign policy interests of the ethnic group and those of the state, and the existence of an indifferent or supportive public opinion. According to the existing literature, an ethnic group is more likely to succeed when it "push(es) on an open door"[80], thus when it promotes policies already favoured by the government.

5. SENDING STATE-DIASPORA RELATIONS THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

The Principal-Agent Model, developed in the field of economics in the 1970s, has been used to describe the relationship between two actors, the principal and the agent, and the complexities arising from information asymmetries and preference misalignment between these two actors. This relationship is described as a process of delegation, in which the principal authorises an agent to act on its behalf through an explicit or implicit contract. The core classical assumptions of this model could be summarised as follows: 1) the agent takes actions that have consequences on the principals; 2) the relationship is characterised by information asymmetry, where the agent may possess better information than the principal, who could only see the outcome, and not every action undertaken by the agent; 3) the preferences between the principal and the agent may diverge, which can lead the agent to act contrary to the principal's expectations and/or to shirk; and 4) both the agent and the principal are rational actors driven by self-interest[81].

Given these assumptions, the literature has identified two main agency problems that characterise this delegation process: adverse selection problem and moral hazard, also defined as agency slack. On the one hand, adverse selection problem refers to an asymmetry in information before a contract is made, where the agent possesses crucial information that would help the principal to make a

---

[78] P.J. Haney - W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation".
[79] Ibid; T. Smith, *Foreign attachments: the power of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy*.
[80] P.J. Haney, W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation", p. 345.
[81] G.J. Miller, "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2005, vol. 8, pp. 205–206.

decision and might decide not to disclose it to the principal[82]. For instance, this situation arises when the principal selects an agent without being able to verify the agent's actual capabilities, as these may be misrepresented by the agent. On the other hand, moral hazard refers to the information asymmetry between a principal and an agent after a contract is made, whereby the agent might have different preferences and therefore undertake actions, which the principal itself cannot directly control, that deviate from the principal's interests[83], without bearing any consequence. Hawkins et al. mention two possible situations: agent's shirking, when an agent reduces the effort to act on the principal's behalf, and agent's slippage, when the agent takes actions according to its own preferences that differ from the principal's[84].

These problems may cause agency loss, that is the discrepancy between the principal's desired outcomes and the actual effects of the agent's actions[85]. Agency loss increases as the misalignment of interests between the principal and the agent widens; moreover, the less control the principal manages to exercise on the activities of the agent, the higher the risks of agency loss, since the agent could be free to act against the principal's interests and priorities, with the latter not being knowledgeable about it.

Scholars of several disciplines realised the usefulness of the Principal-Agent framework and adapted the original model developed in the field of economics to describe several scenarios in different fields of study, such as bureaucracies or other forms of political hierarchy. For instance, the Principal-Agent model has been adapted to the study of US congressional politics, to analyse the choice of states to delegate their actions to International Organisations[86], as well as phenomena such as state-sponsored terrorism[87], foreign subversion[88] and proxy wars[89].

---

[82] M. Bovens *et al.*, *Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory*, in M. Bovens,R.E. Goodin, T. Schillemans (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability*, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 92.
[83] Ibid.
[84] D. Hawkins *et al.*, *Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory*, in D. G. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson, M.J. Tierney, (eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 1[a] ed., p. 8.
[85] A. Lupia, *Delegation of Power: Agency Theory*, in N.J. Smelser, P. B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Elsevier, 2001, pp. 58–60.
[86] C.A. Bradley, J.G. Kelley, "The Concept of International Delegation", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 2008, vol. 71, pp. 1–36; D. Hawkins *et al.*, *Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory*.
[87] E. Berman *et al.*, *Introduction: Principals, Agents, and Indirect Foreign Policies*, in E. Berman - D. Lake (eds.), *Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2019.
[88] M.M. Lee, *Crippling Leviathan: how foreign subversion weakens the state*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca [New York], 2020.
[89] A. Farasoo, "Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory", *International Studies Review*, 2021, vol. 23, pp. 1835–1858; M. Popovic, "Fragile

In the realm of foreign subversion and proxy wars, scholars have highlighted how a state has different options when dealing with another state or a terrorist organisation. It may choose between direct military or diplomatic actions and delegating another actor to act on its behalf, such as a local group. There are several advantages for states to prefer the last option over traditional diplomatic or military approaches: local groups possess a higher level of expertise and knowledge of local conditions; it is usually cheaper for the state to provide military, technical, and economic support to proxies rather than to act directly[90]; domestic groups' local legitimacy is higher[91]; the state can rely on plausible deniability, where in principle it cannot be taken as directly responsible for such actions[92]. The latter is particularly crucial for covert foreign interference activities, proxy wars and state-sponsored terrorism, activities that could be condemned as sovereignty violations and encounter strong retaliation. Indeed, delegating to other actors lowers the likelihood of international backlash since the foreign state's involvement is often ambiguous.

However, the same information asymmetries and agency problems analysed above are encountered by foreign states in these scenarios as well. By delegating to proxies, the state loses control over the course of events, and the proxy could use the support provided by the state to pursue its own goals, which may differ from and be diametrically opposed to the state's ones[93]. In order to reduce the risks of agency slack and adverse selection, Salehyan suggests that delegation to an agent with whom the state shares common ethnicity, religion, and language, provides higher likelihood of convergence in interests and preferences[94].

The adaptation of the Principal-Agent model to proxy wars and foreign interference provides a solid basis to draw some conclusions on how the model could be used to describe the relationship and interaction between a sending state and its diaspora abroad, as the creation of an ethnic lobby by the sending state lies in the grey area between internationally accepted activities and sovereignty violations, and could be regarded as an attempt of foreign interference itself. In this scenario, the sending state, that is the principal, chooses to delegate its population abroad, that is the agent, to act on its behalf as an ethnic lobby advocating for the sending state's interests within the host state. The sending state

---

Proxies: Explaining Rebel Defection Against Their State Sponsors", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2017, vol. 29, pp. 922–942; I. Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2010, vol. 54, pp. 493–515; I. Salehyan *et al.*, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups", *International Organization,* 2011, vol. 65, pp. 709–744.

[90] E. Berman *et al.*, *Introduction: Principals, Agents, and Indirect Foreign Policies*, p. 12.

[91] I. Salehyan *et al.*, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups".

[92] D. Byman, S.E. Kreps, "Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism", *International Studies Perspectives*, 2010, vol. 11, pp. 3–6.

[93] I. Istomin, "How not to interfere in another country's domestic politics", *International Affairs*, 2022, vol. 98, pp. 1677–1694.

[94] I. Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations".

can offer incentives to the diaspora to act as its agent, such as providing material and financial aid to migrant organisations, or granting civil, social, and political rights, allowing, for instance, external voting. In this scenario, diaspora engagement policies can be seen as incentives offered by the sending government to encourage the diaspora to act on its behalf.

Delegation is advantageous because the diaspora possesses better knowledge of the local conditions and of the political dynamics within the host country. In addition, diaspora members occupy a special position as members of the polity of the host state, whether as citizens or permanent residents, and have both higher legitimacy and more capabilities to act. In particular, the population abroad can perform actions by voting within the host country or by pressuring the host government through grassroots mobilisations or direct contacts and interactions with the decision-makers. Clearly, the sending state lacks the skills to perform such actions. In addition, by delegating to the population abroad to act on its behalf, the sending state can interfere in other countries' politics with lower risks of incurring retaliation; thus, the plausible deniability criterion could apply as well.

With regards to the possible agency problems highlighted by the literature, at first glance, Salehyan's reflections on the advantages of choosing an agent which shares the same culture, ethnicity, religion, and language could lead to the conclusion that the chances of divergence of interests between the sending state and the diaspora are lower than in other cases of Principal-Agent relationship, since the diaspora has national, cultural, language and identity ties to the origin state. Nevertheless, even in this case, the sending state still cannot be certain of the diaspora's intentions. Provided that the sending state's objectives are to influence the host country's politics in a way that aligns with its interests, thus ensuring favourable host state policies, the diaspora may not share the same goals and could use the support provided by the sending state to advance its own objectives. Specifically, diasporas might have their own interests and practical concerns deriving from their permanence in the host country, which may not be aligned with the homeland's goals. For instance, the diaspora might advocate for migrant or minority rights in a way that conflicts with the sending state's goals, or it may even seek for a change in the domestic politics in the homeland.

Overall, the Principal-Agent model provides a valuable framework for analysing a sending state that delegates its diaspora to act as a loyal ethnic lobby in the country of residence. The sending state can provide incentives to its population abroad to organise and act on its behalf. Nonetheless, despite the national, cultural, language, ethnic, or religious links that tie migrants abroad to their origin country, the issues of information asymmetries and the risk of defection by the diaspora persist. This analytical lens could be used to analyse concrete cases in which the sending government mobilises its population abroad to act on its behalf as an ethnic lobby and the outcome, evaluating the complexity of these practices, where sending governments and diasporas' interests may not be always fully aligned.

6. A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY SENDING STATE'S MOBILISATION PRACTICES

As it emerges from the preceding sections, transnational studies examining state-diaspora relations and the literature on ethnic lobbies analyse diasporas from two different perspectives.

More specifically, transnational studies primarily focus on the relationship between the sending state and its population abroad. This body of literature explores the strategies and policies implemented by sending governments to engage with their population abroad. Such studies not only categorise the types of policies adopted by countries but also shed light on the underlying motivations driving governments to adopt these practices. For instance, scholars investigating the sending state's engagement policies toward its diaspora acknowledge that the state of origin might try to forge ties with its overseas citizens to pursue its foreign policy objectives. According to Hägel & Peretz, sending states might try to interfere with the politics of other countries, while claiming to take care of their diaspora; as a matter of fact, host countries often blame diasporas for allegedly serving as a fifth column of their homeland[95]. Nevertheless, despite acknowledging the sending states' objective to create a loyal ethnic lobby abroad, these studies do not fully explore the extent to which states succeed in achieving this goal or the concrete impacts of these engagement policies on the lobbying capabilities of migrant communities.

Conversely, the strand of literature focusing on ethnic lobbies investigates the activities of ethnic groups within their host countries, analysing the political strategies employed by these communities to influence the politics of the country of residence in support of the homeland or co-ethnics abroad. These studies sometimes mention the possibility of sending states exploiting and mobilising their co-ethnics abroad to influence the foreign policy of the country of residence in line with the homeland's interests. For instance, Huntington suggests that ethnic lobbies may function as proxies of their sending government[96]. However, to the author's knowledge, they do not offer analytical tools to incorporate the alleged role of the sending government in the analysis of ethnic groups' foreign policy lobbying. This literature focuses instead on events happening within one country, that is the host one.

As a result, while the two strands of literature occasionally refer to each other's subject of study – where studies on state-diaspora relations mention the creation of an ethnic lobby as an objective of sending states and studies on ethnic lobbies mention that sending governments might encourage ethnic minority groups to

---

[95] P. Hägel, P. Peretz, "States and Transnational Actors: Who's Influencing Whom? A Case Study in Jewish Diaspora Politics during the Cold War", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2005, vol. 11, pp. 467–493.

[96] Cited in J.A. Kirk, "Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2008, vol. 4, pp. 275–300.

influence the foreign policy of the host country in line with the homeland's objectives – an integrated approach is lacking. Such an approach would allow understanding how the sending state might try to influence the foreign policy of another state by engaging with its population abroad, assessing the impact of its policies on the establishment of an ethnic lobby.

In their analysis of the Somali Diaspora's efforts to shape the Norwegian policy toward Somalia and their effects, Ebba Tellander and Cindy Horst try to incorporate these two theoretical approaches into an integrated theoretical model[97]. The proposed framework merges the factors of success discussed in the ethnic lobby literature with the transnational ties and activities between the state of origin and the diaspora developed by transnational migration studies. On one hand, ethnic lobby studies allow an understanding of the role of diaspora's in the foreign policy formulation of the host country; on the other hand, the transnational studies on sending state-diaspora relations would allow to understand better the role of transnational bonds with the homeland in shaping the ethnic groups' lobbying efforts, how the collective identity of ethnic groups is formed and where these groups draw their resources from. Tellander and Horst developed their theoretical framework from the triangular model that Adamson proposed to describe the interactions between the overseas community, the sending country, and the country of settlement[98], and integrated the analytical tools offered by both the literature on ethnic lobbies and that on state-diaspora relations (Figure).



Figure: Tellander and Horst's integrated approach
Source: E. Tellander, C. Horst, "A Foreign Policy Actor of Importance? The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Shaping Norwegian Policy towards Somalia," *Foreign Policy Analysis,* 2019, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 151, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orx012.

[97] E. Tellander, C. Horst, "A Foreign Policy Actor of Importance? The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Shaping Norwegian Policy towards Somalia".
[98] F. Adamson, *Mobilizing for the Transformation of Home: Politicized Identities and Transnational Practices*, p. 158.

Overall, the integrated approach proposed by Tellander and Horst has two merits. First, it expands the literature on ethnic lobbying beyond the American setting, proving that the analytical framework developed on US cases can be applied in other contexts. Second, it reintroduces the role of the state of origin and its relations with the overseas population in the complex processes of diaspora lobbying.

Building on their effort, this contribution argues that merging the theoretical frameworks provided respectively by ethnic lobby studies and the literature on diaspora engagement policies might provide a comprehensive understanding of both the motivations and strategies employed by sending states to mobilise their overseas population as an ethnic lobby, as well as the outcomes of such practices.

This merged approach could use the characteristics of ethnic lobbying success developed by the ethnic lobbying literature to evaluate both the potential of the diaspora to influence the host country's politics as well as the impact of sending government's diaspora engagement policies on the establishment of a loyal and powerful ethnic lobby. To operationalise this framework, a longitudinal analysis could be employed, treating the sending governments' policies as the independent variable and the characteristics of ethnic lobbying success as the dependent variable. By analysing overtime variations in the factors of lobbying success within a specific diaspora and the policies adopted by the sending government, researchers could evaluate the effectiveness of diaspora engagement policies in light of their political objectives, determining whether the adoption of such practices could be correlated with changes in the diaspora's political capabilities.

As a result, this merged theoretical framework could enhance the understanding of the ability of sending governments to establish loyal and powerful ethnic lobbies by engaging with their diaspora abroad. However, while this framework might be useful in assessing the sending government's role in the establishment of an ethnic lobby by increasing the diaspora's lobbying capabilities, a more comprehensive analysis of sending governments-diasporas relations should further integrate insights from the Principal-Agent Model. This would allow for a thorough examination of sending government-diaspora relations in concrete instances of mobilisation practices, highlighting how a diaspora, while supported by the sending state through several policies and incentives, may pursue its own goals, potentially diverging from those of the sending state. Such misalignment could potentially undermine the sending government's mobilisation objectives, thereby having an impact on the effectiveness of diaspora engagement policies.

7. THE CASE OF TURKISH-ORIGIN COMMUNITIES IN GERMANY

The Turkish diaspora in Germany, formed through different migrations waves starting in the 1960s, today represents the largest foreign-origin group in the country, with a population of 2.83 million[99].

Given the size of the Turkish diaspora, both in relation to the number of people with foreign origins and the overall German population, as well as the increasing number of diaspora engagement policies adopted by the Turkish government, the case of Turkish-origin communities in Germany provides a useful example to illustrate how the theoretical framework proposed above could be applied to the study of the effects of sending governments policies attempting to mobilise their diaspora for lobbying purposes.

Since the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ankara has intensified its efforts to strengthen ties with the population abroad, promoting a unified identity to harness political resources from overseas citizens, while simultaneously suppressing opposition outside the country. The policies undertaken by the Turkish government reflect the categories of diaspora engagement policies developed by the literature, including the establishment of institutions dealing with the diaspora, the adoption of policies allowing for extraterritorial voting, and initiatives aimed at promoting naturalisation of Turkish individuals in the host country.

Moreover, the Turkish government has begun to engage with its overseas communities by referring to them as a 'diaspora'[100], which could be described as a political project, as noted in previous sections, aiming to categorise overseas Turks and/or related communities, prescribing certain actions, a collective identity, and loyalty to the homeland. This objective is further exemplified by public statements, such as those by the first director of the Presidency for Turks and Relative Communities (YTB), a state office dedicated to overseas citizens, who stated that the goal of the organisation was to "transform Turkish people living abroad from being a mere 'crowd of Turkish people' into a diaspora" that is willing and able to play a relevant political role in the host country[101].

As several studies underline[102], Ankara seeks to extract obligations from its diaspora in the form of political support in the host country, along with electoral

---

[99] Statistical report - Microcensus - Population by migration background - First results 2022 - Table 12211-12, Population by migration status and countries in the year 2022. *[Statistischer Bericht - Mikrozensus - Bevölkerung nach Migrationshintergrund - Erste Ergebnisse 2022 - Tabelle 12211-12, Bevölkerung insgesamt im Jahr 2022 nach Migrationsstatus und Länder]*, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2023.

[100] A. Arkilic, *Between the Homeland and Host States: Turkey's Diaspora Policies and Immigrant Political Participation in France and Germany* (PhD Thesis), Austin, University of Texas at Austin, 2016, p. 75.

[101] Ibid.

[102] F.B. Adamson, "Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s)"; A. Arkilic, "Explaining the evolution of Turkey's diaspora engagement policy: a

support for the incumbent party, the AKP, in elections in the homeland. For instance, in a political rally in Cologne in 2008, Erdoğan stated:

> "With 3 million living in Germany alone, the Turkish community has the potential to be effective and to be a determining factor in German politics today. Why can't we have mayors in Europe, more representatives in political parties in Europe and in the European Parliament? [...] Despite being a handful, some [diaspora] communities are quite influential thanks to their lobbying efforts. Why don't we do the same to protect our own interests?"[103]

Accordingly, the Turkish government does not only wish for Turkish people abroad to be active in the society in which they live, but to do so defending the interests of their homeland. In other words, the Turkish government aims at mobilising the Turkish diaspora to act as a loyal ethnic lobby. The examples already mentioned, such as Ankara's appeals to the diaspora during the 2017 German elections and its efforts to encourage the diaspora to oppose resolutions recognising the Armenian genocide in the host country, illustrate these mobilisation attempts.

As the paragraphs above show, the concepts developed by the diaspora engagement policies literature are well-suited to analyse and categorise the different practices adopted by sending governments towards their population abroad and could be further applied to explore why countries have adopted these policies at a certain moment and what the underlying objectives are. However, as suggested above, this analysis could be complemented with insights from the ethnic lobby literature. In the context of Turkish-origin communities in Germany, the factors linked ethnic lobbying success, such as internal cohesion or the level of political activity, as outlined by the ethnic lobby literature, could be used to assess not only the level of lobbying capacity of the diaspora, but also whether the sending governments' efforts have had the desired effect on the establishment of a powerful ethnic lobby. More specifically, undertaking a longitudinal perspective, the analysis could assess whether there has been a change in the characteristics contributing to ethnic lobbying success of the diaspora under examination, and whether these changes could be the result of the sending government's efforts.

However, while such an analysis might highlight how the Turkish government could impact the lobbying capacity and potential of its diaspora, it would not allow to conclude that the sending government is successful in mobilising its diaspora to act as a loyal ethnic lobby, consistently willing to support the homeland's interests

---

holistic approach", *Diaspora Studies*, 2021, vol. 14, pp. 1–21; Z. S. Mencutek - B. Baser, "Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey's Attempts to Reach Turkish Citizens Abroad", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 2018, vol. 20, pp. 86–105.

[103] Ş.K. Akçapar, D.B. Aksel, "Public Diplomacy through Diaspora Engagement: The Case of Turkey", *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs*, 2017, vol. 22, p. 105.

in the host country. As the sections above have underlined, the framework should be complemented by the adoption of the Principal-Agent model to assess the level of interest alignment between a diaspora and its homeland government. More specifically, a Principal-Agent perspective could be applied to analyse the relationship between the Turkish government, acting as the principal, and the diaspora, acting as the agent, as well as the preference asymmetries that could arise from this relationship. Turkish diaspora engagement policies could be seen as incentives offered by Ankara to encourage the diaspora to act as a loyal ethnic lobby in the country of residence. However, the Turkish diaspora's actions might be driven by practical concerns related to Turkish individuals' living conditions in the host country, which might not align with the homeland's interests and might lead the diaspora to act contrary to Ankara's expectations in specific mobilisation cases. Integrating this analysis might highlight the complexities of the relationship between a sending government and its diaspora in the realm of mobilisation efforts, shedding light on the diaspora's independence from the homeland, and pointing out the difficulties arising from attempting to use diasporas as a tool of statecraft.

8. CONCLUSION

Acknowledging the increasing trend of sending governments engaging with their diaspora, and particularly the existence of instances where governments do so to advance their political objectives in the host country through their population abroad, the aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical contribution to the study of such practices and their effects.

The analysis of the existing literature on both diaspora engagement policies and ethnic lobbies reveals that a theoretical framework to assess the effectiveness of these policies is lacking. On one hand, while the existing literature on sending state-diaspora relations often mentions the goal of creating an ethnic lobby among the reasons why a sending government adopts a set of diaspora engagement policies, it often lacks an explanation of how these policies promote ethnic lobbying, and what the effects and level of success of these strategies are. On the other hand, the existing literature on ethnic lobbying, which examines the impact of ethnic groups' lobbying efforts on a country's foreign policy, often overlooks the role that the sending country can play in mobilising its diaspora for its own interests. While the two bodies of literature undertake two different perspectives to the study of diasporas, one focusing on the relationship between the sending country and its diaspora and the other on the political activities of diasporas in the host country, they have nevertheless some overlapping ideas and concepts.

Rather than engaging in theory-building, this contribution suggests that merging these two existing theoretical frameworks would allow for a better understanding of the relationship between a sending government and its diaspora, considering the sending government's efforts to use the overseas population to

advance foreign policy objectives within the host country. By integrating insights from both the ethnic lobby literature and diaspora engagement policies studies, future studies could analyse the relationship between sending governments and its diaspora but also the effectiveness of such mobilisation efforts aimed at establishing a loyal and powerful ethnic lobby.

Moreover, given the sending governments' goal of encouraging its population abroad to act on its behalf, the contribution underlines how integrating an analysis of sending state-diaspora relations through the lenses of the Principal-Agent model might shed further light on the dynamics between the two actors, underscoring the complexities of the relationship between a diaspora and its sending government and the possibility of interest misalignment.

To conclude, evaluating the effectiveness of sending governments' efforts aimed at mobilising their diaspora to further the homeland's interests in the host country will be valuable not only from an academic perspective, but also at the political level. As previously mentioned, assessing the impact of these practices will be important for policymakers, as these policies might constitute a new tool of foreign policy in the hands of sending governments. Furthermore, these actions may be perceived as a form of foreign interference by host countries, prompting new political issues and necessitating policy responses.

Bibliography

F. Adamson, *Mobilizing for the Transformation of Home: Politicized Identities and Transnational Practices*, in N. Al-Ali, K. Koser (eds.), *New Approaches to Migration?,* Routledge, London 2002, 1[a] ed.

F. Adamson, M. Demetriou, "Remapping the Boundaries of 'State' and 'National Identity': Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing", *European Journal of International Relations - EUR J INT RELAT*, 2007, vol. 13, pp. 489–526.

F.B. Adamson, "Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s)", *International Migration Review*, 2019, vol. 53, pp. 210–236

M.E. Ahrari (eds.), *Ethnic groups and U.S. foreign policy*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987.

Ş.K. Akçapar, D.B. Aksel, "Public Diplomacy through Diaspora Engagement: The Case of Turkey", *PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs*, 2017, vol. 22, pp. 135–160.

N. Al-Ali, K. Koser, *Transnationalism, international migration and home*, in Id. *New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home*, Routledge, London 2002, 1[a] ed.

T. Ambrosio (eds.), *Ethnic identity groups and U.S. foreign policy*, Praeger, Westport, Conn, 2002.

A. Arkilic, *Between the Homeland and Host States: Turkey's Diaspora Policies and Immigrant Political Participation in France and Germany* (PhD Thesis), Austin, University of Texas at Austin, 2016.

A. Arkilic, "Explaining the evolution of Turkey's diaspora engagement policy: a holistic approach", *Diaspora Studies*, 2021, vol. 14, pp. 1–21.

A. Arkilic, "Empowering a fragmented diaspora: Turkish immigrant organizations' perceptions of and responses to Turkey's diaspora engagement policy", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2022, vol. 27, pp. 588–613.

L.G. Basch, N.G. Schiller, C. Szanton Blanc, *Nations unbound: transnational projects, postcolonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation-states*, Gordon and Breach, 1994.

R. Bauböck, "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism", *The International Migration Review*, 2003, vol. 37, pp. 700–723.

E. Berman, D. Lake, G. Miquel, P. Yared, *Introduction: Principals, Agents, and Indirect Foreign Policies*, in E. Berman, D. Lake (eds.), *Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2019.

M. Bovens, R.E. Goodin, T. Schillemans, S. Gailmard, *Accountability and Principal–Agent Theory*, in M. Bovens, R.E. Goodin, T. Schillemans (eds.), in *The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability*, Oxford University Press, 2014.
C.A. Bradley, J.G. Kelley, "The Concept of International Delegation", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 2008, vol. 71, pp. 1–36.
L.A. Brand, *Citizens abroad: emigration and the state in the Middle East and North Africa*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006.
R. Brubaker, "The 'diaspora' diaspora", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2005, vol. 28, pp. 1–19.
R. Brubaker, J. Kim, "Transborder Membership Politics in Germany and Korea", *European Journal of Sociology*, 2011, vol. 52, pp. 21–75.
K.D. Butler, "Defining Diaspora, Refining a Discourse", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 2001, vol. 10, pp. 189–219.
D. Byman, S.E. Kreps, "Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored Terrorism", *International Studies Perspectives*, 2010, vol. 11, pp. 1–18.
R. Cohen, *Global diasporas: an introduction*, Routledge, London, 2008.
M. Collyer (eds.), *Emigration Nations, Policies and Ideologies of Emigrant Engagement*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, 2013.
C. Dalaman, "Reactions from German politicians to Erdogan's voters: Demands to halt dual citizenship" *[Alman siyasetçilerden Erdoğan seçmenlerine tepkiler: Çifte vatandaşlık durdurulsun talepleri]*, *VOA Türkçe*, 2023, URL: https://www.voaturkce.com/a/alman-siyasetcilerden-erdogan-secmenlerinetep-kiler-cifte-vatandaslik-durdurulsun-talepleri/7118721.html [Last accessed August 2023].
A. Délano, A.J. Gamlen, "Comparing and theorizing state-diaspora relations", *Political Geography*, 2014, vol. 41, pp. 43–53.
S. Dufoix, *Diasporas*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008.
S. Dufoix, *Diaspora before it became a concept*, in R. Cohen, C. Fischer (eds.) *Routledge Handbook of Diaspora Studies*, Routledge, 2018.
"Erdogan tells Turks in Germany to punish Merkel", *Deutsche Welle*, 2017, URL: https://www.dw.com/en/erdogan-tells-german-turks-not-to-vote-for-angelamerkel/a-40149680 [Last accessed on 23 August 2023].
A. Farasoo, "Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory", *International Studies Review,* 2021, vol. 23, pp. 1835–1858.
A.J. Gamlen, "The emigration state and the modern geopolitical imagination", *Political Geography*, 2008, vol. 27, pp. 840–856.
A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora Institutions and Diaspora Governance", *International Migration Review*, 2014, vol. 48, pp. 180–217.
A.J. Gamlen, "Diaspora engagement Policies: what are they and what kinds of states use them?", *University of Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS)*, *Working Paper,* no. 06/32, 2006.

D.H. Goldberg, *Foreign policy and ethnic interest groups: American and Canadian Jews lobby for Israel*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1990.
P. Hägel, P. Peretz, "States and Transnational Actors: Who's Influencing Whom? A Case Study in Jewish Diaspora Politics during the Cold War", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2005, vol. 11 pp. 467–493.
P.J. Haney, "Ethnic Lobbying in Foreign Policy", *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2010.
P.J. Haney, W. Vanderbush, "The Role of Ethnic Interest Groups in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Cuban American National Foundation", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1999, vol. 43, pp. 341–361.
D. Hawkins, D.A. Lake, D.L. Nielson, M.J. Tierney, *Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory*, in D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, M.J. Tierney (eds.), *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 1ª ed., pp. 3–38.
I. Istomin, "How not to interfere in another country's domestic politics", *International Affairs*, 2022, vol. 98 pp. 1677–1694.
J. Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants' Political Transnationalism", *International Migration Review*, 2000, vol. 34, pp. 1126-1154.
J.A. Kirk, "Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2008, vol. 4, pp. 275–300.
N. Kleist, "In the Name of Diaspora: Between Struggles for Recognition and Political Aspirations", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* 2008, vol. 34, pp. 1127–1143.
M.M. Lee, *Crippling Leviathan: how foreign subversion weakens the state*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca [New York], 2020.
W.M. LeoGrande, "Pushing on an Open Door? Ethnic Foreign Policy Lobbies and the Cuban American Case", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2020, vol. 16, pp. 438–456.
P. Levitt, R. De La Dehesa, "Transnational migration and the redefinition of the state: Variations and explanations", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2003, vol. 26, pp. 587–611.
A. Lupia, *Delegation of Power: Agency Theory*, in N.J. Smelser, P.B. Baltes (eds.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, Elsevier, 2001.
T. Lyons, "Conflict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia: Analysis", *Conflict, Security & Development,* 2007, vol. 7, pp. 529–549.
C. McC. Mathias, "Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, 1981, vol. 59
J.J. Mearsheimer, SM. Walt, *The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2007.
Z. S. Mencutek, B. Baser, "Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey's Attempts to Reach Turkish Citizens Abroad", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 2018, vol. 20, pp. 86–105.

G.J. Miller, "The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models", *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2005, vol. 8, pp. 203–225.
A.S. Okyay, *Diaspora-making as a state-led project: Turkey's expansive diaspora strategy and its implications for emigrant and kin populations* (PhD Thesis), European University Institute, 2015.
C. Orjuela, "Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka's violent conflict", *Global Networks,* 2008, vol. 8, pp. 436–452.
E. Østergaard-Nielsen (eds.), *International migration and sending countries: perceptions, policies, and transnational relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2003.
E. Østergaard-Nielsen, "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices", *The International Migration Review*, 2003, vol. 37, pp. 760–786.
K. Oświecimski, "What makes ethnic groups in the United States politically effective", *Horizons of Politics*, 2013, vol. 4, pp. 43–74.
D.M. Paul, R.A. Paul, *Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2009.
M. Popovic, "Fragile Proxies: Explaining Rebel Defection Against Their State Sponsors", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2017, vol. 29, pp. 922–942.
A. Portes, *Globalization from below: the rise of transnational communities*, in W.C. Smith, R. Korzeniewicz (eds.), *Latin America in the world economy*, CN, Westport 1996, pp. 151–168.
A. Portes, "Conclusion: Towards a new world - the origins and effects of transnational activities", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1999, vol. 22, pp. 463–477.
F. Ragazzi, "A comparative analysis of diaspora policies", *Political Geography*, 2014, vol. 41, pp. 74–89.
F. Ragazzi, *When Governments say Diaspora: Transnational Practices of Citizenship, Nationalism and Sovereignty in Croatia and Former Yugoslavia* (PhD Thesis), Northwestern University, 2010.
T. Rubenzer, "Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and U.S. Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2008, vol. 4, pp. 169–185.
J. Rynhold, "Divide and Rule: Discursive Authority, Identity Dissonance, Ethnic Lobbies, and US Foreign Policy, or How President Obama Defeated AIPAC over the 2015 Iran Deal", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2021, vol. 17.
H.M. Rytz, *Ethnic interest groups in U.S. foreign policy-making: a Cuban-American story of success and failure*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, New York, 2013.
W. Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1991, vol. 1 pp. 83–99.
I. Salehyan, "The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2010, vol. 54, pp. 493–515.
I. Salehyan, KS. Gleditsch, D.E. Cunningham, "Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups", *International Organization*, 2011, vol. 65, pp. 709–744.

C. Schäfer, "China's Diaspora Policy under Xi Jinping: content, limits and challenges", *SWP Research Paper*, 2022.
N.G. Schiller, L. Basch, C. Blanc-Szanton, "Towards a Definition of Transnationalism", *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 1992, vol. 645, pp. ix–xiv.
Y. Shain, "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy", *Political Science Quarterly*, 1994, vol. 109, pp. 811–841.
Y. Shain, A. Barth, "Diasporas and International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, 2003, vol. 57, pp. 449–479.
M.P. Smith, L. Guarnizo (eds.), *Transnationalism from below*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, N.J, 1998.
T. Smith, *Foreign attachments: the power of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, London, England, 2000.
Statistical report - Microcensus - Population by migration background - First results 2022 - Table 12211-12, Population by migration status and countries in the year 2022 - *[Statistischer Bericht - Mikrozensus - Bevölkerung nach Migrationshintergrund - Erste Ergebnisse 2022 - Tabelle 12211-12, Bevölkerung insgesamt im Jahr 2022 nach Migrationsstatus und Länder]*, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2023.
E. Tellander, C. Horst, "A Foreign Policy Actor of Importance? The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Shaping Norwegian Policy towards Somalia", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2019, vol. 15, pp. 136–154.
K. Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment", *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1996, vol 5, pp. 3–36.
"Turkish support in Germany for Erdogan fuels integration debate", *France 24*, 2023, URL: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230601-turkish-support-in-germany-for-erdogan-fuels-integration-debate [Last accesses September 2023].
A. Üstübici, "Dynamics in emigration and immigration policies of Morocco: a double engagement", *Migration and Development*, 2015, vol. 4, pp. 238–255.
L. Varadarajan, *The domestic abroad: diasporas in international relations*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010.
A. Wimmer, N. Glick Schiller, "Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation–state building, migration and the social sciences", *Global Networks*, 2002, vol. 2, pp. 301–334.
A. Wong, *The Diaspora and China's Foreign Influence Activities*, in L. Myers (eds.), *2021-2022 Wilson China Fellowship- Essays on China and U.S. Policy*, Wilson Center, 2022.